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COPYRIGHT DEPOSE 



ftrutb anb Error 



A STUDY IN CRITICAL LOGIC 



BY 
ALOYSIUS J. ROTHER, S.J. 

Professor of Philosophy in St. Louis University 



ST. LOUIS, MO., 1914 

Published by B. Herder 

17 South Broadway 

FREIBURG (BADEN) I LONDON, W. C. 

GERMANY I 68, Great Russell Str. 






IMPRIMI POTEST 

A. J. Burr owes, SJ. 
Praep. Prov. 

NIHIL OBSTAT 

Sti. Ludovici, die 17. Nov. 1913 

F. G. Holweck, 
Censor Librorum 



IMPRIMATUR 

Sti. Ludovici, die 18. Nov. 1913 

^Joannes L Glennon, 
Archie pis co pus 
Sti. Ludovici 



Copyright, 1914 

by 

Joseph Gummersbach 



All rights reserved 
Made in U. S. A. 



JAN 20 1914 



©C1.A361662 



INTRODUCTION, 

Truth is the goal of the intellect as well as 
its perfection and ornament. In spite of this 
there are philosophers who maintain the inability 
of the intellect to attain truth and make bold to 
deny the very existence of truth. Their systems 
are known by various names, such as: skepticism, 
idealism, relativism, pragmatism. In refutation 
of these systems and in defense of the rights of 
reason, the schoolmen have developed a special 
science which they call " Critical Logic." 

The purpose of this science is threefold: to 
examine and demonstrate the nature of truth, to 
vindicate the ability of the intellect to attain 
truth, and to establish the criterion for distin- 
guishing truth from error. 

The following treatise on " Truth and Error " 
is submitted as an exposition of the first of these 
three purposes. 

Special stress has been laid on the positive 
doctrine, and many unnecessary controversies 
have been dispensed with in the hope of assist- 
ing the earnest student to a clear understanding 
of the foundations of knowledge. 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/trutherrorstudyiOOroth 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction - . . . . iii 

CHAPTER x 

i Introductory Notions I 

2 The Subject of Logical Truth 26 

Art. 1 Logical Truth in the Simple Appre- 
hension 26 

Art. 2 Logical Truth in the Judgment . . 36 

§1 General Criterion for the Pres- 
ence of Perfect Truth ... 36 

§2 Conditions for Perfect Truth Ob- 
tain in the Judgment Alone . 47 

§3 Perfection of Truth in the Judg- 
ment Alone 59 

3 Degrees of Logical Truth 70 

4 Definition of Error or Logical Falsity . . 85 

5 Error in Relation to Ideas and Judgments . 90 

Art. 1 Ideas not Subject to Error ... 90 

Art. 2 Judgments Subject to Error ... 92 

6 The Will in Relation to Error 104 

7 Error, in What Respect Necessary . . . .118 



TRUTH AND ERROR 

CHAPTER FIRST 
Introductory Notions 

Summary: Purport of treatise — Definition of truth — 
Division of truth into ontological, logical 
and moral — Moral truth and propositional 
truth compared — Truth used metaphor- 
ically — Truth contrasted with its opposite, 
falsity — Truth an analogical concept — 
Truth of knowledge, truth properly so 
called — Thesis — Proof — Some subsidiary 
terms explained — Apprehension — Idea — 

Notion and Concept — Subjective and ob- 
jective concept — Corollary — Material ob- 
ject and formal object of an idea — Differ- 
ence between idea and phantasm — An ob- 
jection answered — Judgment defined — 
Essence of judgment determined — Divi- 
sion of judgments into immediate and me- 
diate, analytical and synthetical — Proposi- 
tion — Return to main topic. 

I. Purport of Treatise. The treatise we 
are about to present is inscribed " Truth and 
Error." The truth here discussed is logical 
truth or truth of knowledge. For truth in con- 
tradistinction to error always designates the truth 
of knowledge. 



2 Truth and Error 

2. Definition of Truth. Truth in general 

is described as " conformity between thought and 
thing." The accuracy of this definition is best 
shown by what is known as the " analytical proc- 
ess." In this process (fully set forth in Dialec- 
tics) we first consider the objects to which the 
notion whose definition is sought can be applied ; 
then, disregarding what is peculiar to each of 
these objects we disentangle the element com- 
mon to all. This common element constitutes 
the definition desired. Thus if I wish to find 
the definition, say of " man," by this method, I 
place before my mind the different races of men, 
Caucasians, Indians, Negroes, Malays, and Mon- 
golians, and then suppressing in whatever they 
differ, retain only what belongs to all, viz. : ani- 
mality and rationality. In this manner I come 
to know that " man " is a rational animal, and 
this is the definition of "man." We shall now 
employ the same method of procedure in the 
case of truth. 

Truth, according to its ordinary acceptation, is 
a term of the broadest application. It is applied 
to things as well as to the mental and oral ex- 
pression of these things. Here are a few in- 
stances typical of this diversity of usage. 
" William is a true friend of mine " ; " My idea 
of God is true " ; " The words this witness has 
just spoken, are true." 

In all these examples, the adjective "true" is 



Introductory Notions g 

used to indicate that there exists some sort of 
conformity between thought and thing. " Con- 
formity between thought and thing " is then the 
general definition of truth. 

To make this definition clearer, we shall sub- 
mit the sentences just given to an analysis. What 
do I mean when I call William a true friend of 
mine? I mean that his sentiments and conduct 
towards me correspond to my conception or 
idea of " friend " and " friendship." And 
when I ascribe truth to my ideas and judgments, 
what do I intend to express? Nothing else ex- 
cept that they are conformable to reality. And 
lastly, why do I say that a witness speaks the 
truth or that his words are true ? I do so because 
his utterances accord with his (subjective) judg- 
ments regarding the matter about which he gives 
me information. 

Thus it becomes manifest that truth always 
implies some sort of correspondence between 
thought and thing. This is sufficiently evident 
as regards the first two instances given. For in 
the first instance the conformity of William to 
my idea of friend and in the second instance, 
the conformity of one of my ideas to God plainly 
denote correspondence between thought and 
thing. 

It is needless to point out that when we op- 
pose thought to thing we use " thing" in a 
restricted sense, namely as contradistinguished 



4 Truth and Error 

from the mere expression or representation of 
something; for taking thing in its broadest sig- 
nification, it includes thought. 

But how does the third sort of conformity — 
namely the conformity between the spoken word 
and the (subjective) judgment in a person's 
mind — tally with our general definition of 
truth? What corresponds to "thing" here? 
Perhaps the " spoken word "? But how can the 
" spoken word " be regarded as a " thing " any 
more than " thought " since it is likewise merely 
the expression or a sign of something else? To 
this we reply that words can be looked upon as 
things in so far as they stand for things, and 
so they must be taken in our present discussion, 
since there can be no resemblance between the 
material word and the idea but only between 
the object signified by the word and the idea. 
Hence conformity of speech (or words) with 
thought must be understood to be conformity 
of speech as expressive of things with 
thought. Consequently, it is correct to say that 
truth in general is " conformity between thought 
and thing." 

3. Division of Truth into Ontological, Log- 
ical, and Moral. We now pass to the classi- 
fication of truth. Truth is threefold, namely, 
ontological, logical, and moral. The meaning 
and correctness of this division will become 



Introductory Notions 5 

readily apparent if we examine a little more 
closely into the examples given above. 

When I say, " This man is a ' true ' or ' gen- 
uine ' friend/' I mean that he combines in him- 
self all that goes to make up my idea of " friend " ; 
in other words, that his sentiments and conduct 
are in conformity with this idea. It is plain 
that in this instance " true " indicates the cor- 
respondence of a reality or thing (a person in the 
case cited) with an idea; and this is what 
is called " ontological " truth or truth of 
" being " ; it is defined as " correspondence of 
thing with thought." Now this correspondence 
may be twofold according as a thing is com- 
pared with an idea as a pattern which it imi- 
tates or as a standard by which it is judged or 
estimated. Thus a vein of yellow metal in a 
rock is said to be " true " gold in respect to the 
Divine idea because it has been patterned after 
a conception in God's mind. The mine-owner, 
on the other hand, pronounces the glittering 
streak of precious metal " true " gold because he 
knows what gold is and because he finds that the 
newly discovered vein imbedded in the wall of 
his mine exactly answers to his conception of 
gold. He uses his conception as a standard by 
which to gage the object under consideration. 

The other example which we gave to illustrate 
the general notion of truth was, " My ideas re- 



6 Truth and Error, 

garding a certain matter are true." A little re- 
flection will show us that here we have to do 
with a species of truth different from onto- 
logical. For I call my ideas true because they 
are conformable to things, and not because things 
are conformable to them. This kind of con- / 
formity is named logical truth or truth of knowl- 
edge and may be defined as " conformity of 
thought with thing or of knowledge with the ob- 
ject known." 

We would remark here that though the defi- 
nitions of ontological and logical truth seem to 
be alike — the terms of comparison " thing " and 
" thought " being the same in both — they are 
by no means identical. For in defining onto- 
logical truth, "thing" is the subject of the rela- 
tion between thing and thought, and " thought " - 
the term, while in defining logical truth the 
reverse is the case. Again, thing and thought 
fulfil altogether different functions in each of the 
two cases. For in logical truth, the thing 
known produces or gages my perception of it 
whereas in ontological truth, the thing is 
produced, gaged, or estimated according to the 
idea to which it is compared. Thus when I say, 
" The judgment, David was a hero, is logic- 
ally true," I regard the Jewish king's heroism, 
namely his physical prowess and nobility of soul, 
as determining or giving rise to this judgment. 
But when I affirm, " King David is a true 



Introductory Notions J 

hero/' I gage or estimate the genuineness 
of his heroism according to my idea of a hero. 

We may confirm the foregoing statement as to 
the difference between ontological and logical 
truth by a short quotation from St. Thomas. 1 
He says : " Similitudo rei cognitae dupliciter est 
in cognoscente, uno modo sicut causata a re . . . 
alio modo sicut causa rei, ut patet in artifice, qui 
cognoscit artificiatum per illam formam, per 
quam ipsum fecit." This passage may be ren- 
dered thus : " The likeness of the object known 
is in the mind in a twofold manner; namely 
either as caused by the object ... or else as the 
cause of the object: the latter we see in the case 
of the artist who knows the work of art he is 
producing by the conception which guides him 
in making it." 

The above discussion shows that the relations 
between thought and thing in the definitions of 
ontological and logical truth are as different as 
are those of father to son and son to father. 

We now come to the consideration of the third 
example given before, namely, " The words of 
this witness are true," " He speaks the truth." 
When I say this I do not want to denote either 
correspondence of thing with thought, nor of 
thought with thing, but what I want to signify 
is, that the speech or the words of the witness 
express his mind or are conformed to what 

1 Quodl. 7, a. 3. 



8 Truth and Error 

he judges in regard to the matter to which 
he bears testimony. Such conformity between 
speech and subjective judgment is called moral 
truth. One whose utterances are habitually in 
accord with his beliefs, whether right or wrong, 
is called truthful. It is for this reason that this 
kind of truth is characterized as " moral." For 
the employment of language expressing the hid- 
den thoughts of the mind depends upon the 
proper exercise of our free will, and hence con- 
stitutes a praiseworthy or moral action. 

4. Moral Truth and Prepositional Truth 
Compared. Moral truth must not, however, 
be confounded with the truth of a proposition. 
For a proposition is said to be true when it ex- 
presses a judgment conformable to reality, 
whereas moral truth or truth of speech consists 
in this that my words — which, of course, will 
likewise take the form of a proposition — set 
forth a judgment I have formed of something, 
regardless of the fact whether this judgment is 
in itself true or false. 

5. Truth Used Metaphorically. The word 
" true " ds also frequently employed metaphoric- 
ally without any distinct reference to thought, 
as when an officer is said to be true to his charge, 
or a patriot true to his country, or a copy a true 
likeness of the original. But a little reflection 
will show that even here the word " true " is 
used on account of some sort of conformity or 



Introductory Notions 9 

correspondence of one thing to another as to its 
rule, standard, or pattern. Hence " true " in all 
the aforenamed significations bears at least some 
analogy to the same word taken strictly. 

6. Truth Contrasted with Its Opposite 
Falsity. A little additional light might be 
thrown on the definition of truth by offsetting 
it with the definition of its opposite, falsity. 
Since truth is conformity between thought and 
thing, its contrary or opposite is, of course, want 
of conformity or rather discrepancy between 
thought and thing. Like truth, it is either on- 
tological, logical, or moral, according as thing is 
at variance with thought, or thought with thing, 
or speech with the speaker's private judg- 
ment. 

Here it should be further noted that logical 
and moral falsity have received special names, 
the former being called error and the latter, a 
lie or falsehood. 

From these remarks we infer that logical 
truth may be accompanied by moral falsity, as 
when one knows that he is chargeable with 
theft, but denies his guilt. Again, there may 
be moral truth and logical falsity in regard to 
the same thing; and this always happens when 
one is mistaken about something and asserts his 
mistaken views in good faith. It is also possible 
that logical and moral falsity should go together ; 
such would be the case if a person at the same 
time erred in respect to some fact and asserted 



jo Truth and Error^ 

the contrary of what he thought Suppose a 
young man who has been kidnaped in his child- 
hood were to give himself out as the son of his 
real parents thinking, however, that he was prac- 
ticing deceit, he would at the same time be mis- 
taken and tell a lie. 

7. Truth an Analogical Concept. The 
preceding considerations show that the concept 
" truth " is applied to thing, thought, and speech 
in a meaning partly the same and partly differ- 
ent. For the three classes of truth all imply 
conformity between thought and thing; but the 
kind of conformity is different in each as an 
examination of their definitions will readily re- 
veal. Hence the concept of truth is what is 
called an " analogous " concept, that is, a con- 
cept which is affirmed of the classes contained 
under it in a signification partly the same and 
partly different. 

8. Truth of Knowledge Truth Properly So^ 
called. We are now done with the division 
of truth into its three kinds, viz., ontological, 
logical, and moral, or, truth of being, truth of 
knowledge, and truth of speech. The question 
now arises, to which of these three kinds of 
truth is the term " truth " most properly ap- 
plied. 

For the sake of greater clearness and em- 
phasis we shall state the answers to all leading 
questions in the form of theses or propositions. 



Introductory Notions II 



THESIS m 

The name " TRUTH " belongs pri- 
marily to truth of knowledge. 

9. Proof. What we wish to say when we 
make this statement is, that, according to com- 
mon usage, truth is ascribed first and foremost 
to mental acts, and to things and speech only in 
a secondary sense by reason of their resem- 
blance to truth of thought. In other words, 
all we maintain «is, that the principal and ordi- 
nary signification of " truth " is logical truth, 
just as the principal meaning of the word 
" sharp " is, " having a thin edge or fine point/' 
although it is also taken in a number of other 
senses more or less connected with the principal 
one. Now dictionaries are generally the best 
authorities to determine the common usage of 
words. Let us then turn to one of the best of 
them, the Century Dictionary. This dictionary 
— and with it all the others of any completeness 
are in substantial agreement — arranges the 
meanings of truth in this order: 

(a) Conformity of thought with fact, con- 
formity of a judgment, statement, or belief with 
reality. 

(b) The state of being made true or exact; 
exact conformity to model, rule, or plan; accu- 
racy of adjustment. 



12 Truth and Error 

(c) (In the fine arts.) The proper or cor- 
rect representation of an object in nature. . . . 

(d) Veracity, truthfulness . . . 

Now the first of these definitions describes 
logical, and the second, ontological truth; the 
third refers to one of the metaphorical accepta- 
tions of truth, and the fourth relates to moral 
truth. 

We shall now confirm the verdict of the dic- 
tionaries by the authority of St. Thomas, who, 
let it be noticed in passing, has been particularly 
lauded for his concise and exact definitions of 
terms. 

We will make Sir William Hamilton our 
spokesman and thus at the same time corrob- 
orate by the eminent Scotch philosopher's sanc- 
tion what we assert to be the prevailing signifi- 
cation of the term under consideration. He 
says : 1 " All admit that by truth is understood 
an agreement, or correspondence between our 
thought and that which we think about. This 
definition we owe to the schoolmen. ' Veritas 
intellectus,' says Aquinas, ' est adaequatio intel- 
lects et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse 
quod est, et non esse quod non est/ " 

It will be well to subjoin another quotation 
from St. Thomas more directly to the point. 
He writes : 2 " Veritas proprie est in solo intel- 

1 Logic 27. 

2 Sum. Theo., p. i f q. 16, a. 8. 



Introductory Ndtions 13 

lectu; res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae 
est in aliquo intellectu," that is to say, " Truth 
is properly in the intellect alone; things are 
called true by reason of the truth which is in 
some intellect." 

Logical truth or truth of knowledge then is 
truth properly so called; things and speech are 
styled true only in a secondary or analogous 
sense, as bearing a certain resemblance to truth 
of knowledge. At present our concern is with 
truth of knowledge. The truth of words and 
propositions, technically known as " the truth 
of the sign" 1 (sc. of logical truth), is likewise 
considered here. It is plain that truth is 
ascribed to words and propositions by way of 
metonymy. For this figure of speech names 
the sign after the thing signified. 

10. Some Subsidiary Terms Explained. 
But before we go any further, a short digression 
will be of service in order to explain a few terms 
of frequent occurrence in these pages, to wit, 
the terms apprehension, idea, concept, notion, 
and judgment. 

11. Apprehension. Apprehension in phil- 
osophical language has a variety of meanings. 
It is applied not only to acts of the intellect, but 
also to those of the sensitive faculties, espe- 
cially of the imagination. Thus the Century 
Dictionary tells us that apprehension has been 

1 Cf. Vocabulary of Philosophy bv W. Fleming, under 
"Truth." 



14 Truth and Error 

used to express intellection in general, 
cognition, understanding, conception, attention, 
memory, imagination, formerly emotion or 
sensibility." In this treatise apprehension is 
taken in a restricted sense for the first or most 
fundamental operation of the intellect and may 
be defined as the act by which the mind merely 
perceives or " seizes " an object. Now the mind 
perceives an object by representing it to itself, 
by, so to speak, depicting it in mental colors on 
itself. For this reason apprehension has also 
been described as an operation by which the in- 
tellect represents an object to itself. Note that 
in the definition given first we stated that 
through the apprehension the understanding 
merely perceives an object. The qualifying ad- 
verb " merely " was employed to indicate that 
the first operation of the mind neither affirms 
nor denies anything. On this account apprehen- 
sion in its present technical signification is often 
designated as " simple " to distinguish it from 
the more " complex " act of cognition, the 
judgment. Hence simple apprehension has been 
aptly called " conception without judgment." 

12. Idea. Idea, the second term to be ex- 
plained, is defined as the representation of an 
object by the mind. If we compare this defi- 
nition with that of apprehension, we will find 
apprehension and idea to be the same thing, only 



Introductory Notions [ig 

conceived in a somewhat different way. For 
the definition of apprehension (viz., an act of 
the mind representing an object), gives promi- 
nence to the fact that a certain thought-for- 
mation is an act, and reduces to a secondary 
position, the circumstance that this thought- 
formation results in a representation, whereas 
the definition of idea (viz., the representation of 
an object by an act of the mind), reverses this 
order. 

13. Notion and Concept. Notion and con- 
cept are synonyms of idea, the three differing 
merely in this that idea (from Sea, image) re- 
gards a mental representation as a picture — 
notion (from noscere, to get knowledge of) 
views it as that by which we come to know am 
object — and concept (from concipere, to con- 
ceive) considers it as something to which the 
mind, as it were, gives birth. 

14. Subjective and Objective Concept. 
The term concept is often qualified as either 
" subjective " or " objective "; and as these two 
uses of the word have considerable bearing on 
our subsequent discussions, we must give them 
some further attention. A concept, as just 
stated, is a mental expression of an object. 
This is the "subjective" concept; for a mental 
expression of an object is a cognitive act, and 
hence something subjective. But the word 



d6 Truth and Error, 

" concept " is likewise employed to signify the 
object expressed by the subjective concept, and 
then it is styled " objective " concept. 

To confirm the foregoing remarks by the au- 
thority of others, we shall set down the defini- 
tions of the " subjective" and the " objective " 
concept as given by two well-known recent ex- 
ponents of scholastic philosophy, Fr. Lahousse, 
S. J. and Fr. Urraburu, S. J. 

Fr. Lahousse says: 1 " Conceptus subjecti- 
vus seu formalis definitur: Repraesentatio intel- 
lectualis rei alicujus. Res ipsa seu subjectum, 
quod proprie et immediate per conceptum f orma- 
lem repraesentatur . . . vocatur objectum ideae 
seu etiam conceptus objectivus." In English: 
" The subjective or formal concept is defined 
as the intellectual representation of something. 
The thing or object itself which is properly and 
immediately represented ... by the formal 
concept is called the object or the objective con- 
cept." Fr. Urraburu writes : 2 " Formalis 
conceptus est actus ipse cognitionis objec- 
tum quodlibet repraesentantis ; objectivus est 
objectum prouti tali conceptu expressum. . . . 
Ita cum bovem concipio, conceptus formalis est 
meus actus cognitionis, nimirum entitas quaedam 
spiritualis inhaerens intellectui; objectivus vero 
est bos ipse intellectus prouti intelligitur ; " that 

1 Praelect. Logic, et Ontol, run. 12 & 13. 

2 Logica, p. 129. 



Introductory Notions 1J 

is to say, "The subjective concept is the act 
of cognition representing some object; the ob- 
jective is the object as expressed by such a con- 
cept. . . . Thus when I conceive of an ox, the 
subjective concept is my own act of cognition, 
namely, a certain spiritual entity inhering in my 
mind, but the objective concept is the ox itself 
in so far as it is known." 

Nor should the employment of the phrase 
"objective concept " for the thing as known 
seem strange; for it is not unusual to name the 
object of an act after that act. Thus a mother 
will call her little son, " My love," meaning 
that he is the object of her love. — Many a 
traveller on first beholding the falls of Niagara 
exclaims : " What a magnificent sight ! " where 
sight, though it properly denotes the act of see- 
ing, stands for the object of the act of vision. 
This way of naming a thing by one of its attri- 
butes or accompaniments is called metonymy by 
rhetoricians. 

15. Corollary. Such being the nature of 
the subjective and objective concept it follows 
that when logical truth is defined to be the con- 
formity of a concept with the object as it is in 
itself, there is question of the subjective con- 
cept; for the objective concept being the object 
as known, is identical with the object as it is in 
itself, and not comformable to it. 

16. Material and Formal Object of an 



i8 Truth and Error 

Idea. There are two other expressions inti- 
mately connected with those just explained that 
claim our special consideration, namely, the ex- 
pressions "material object of an idea" and 
" formal object of an idea." But first of all 
we must state what is meant by the object of 
an idea in general. The word "object" is de- 
rived from the Latin verb " objicere " which 
signifies " to throw or set before." Hence the 
object of an idea in general is that which is set 
before the mind by means of the idea, or that 
which the idea represents. Now this object re- 
garded as it is in itself with all its notes or 
attributes is called the material object of the 
idea — its subject-matter, as it were. But the 
particular attribute or assemblage of attributes 
which the intellect actually represents to itself 
in the material object is called the formal (or 
proper) object of the idea. The object is thus 
qualified by the adjective " formal," because 
the attributes actually perceived in a thing, 
are, so to speak, the aspects or " formalities " 
under which the material object is viewed. 
Hence the formal object is nothing else than 
the material object considered as to the aspects 
(or formalities) actually expressed by the idea. 
To illustrate our definitions by an example: 
Suppose you see a deer running in a forest and 
you fix your gaze exclusively, say, on its grace- 
ful figure, then this figure will be the formal 



Introductory Notions 19 

object of the idea you have formed of the ani- 
mal you are observing. Now suppose you note 
that the creature is fleet of foot and bears ant- 
lers, then these peculiarities will become the 
formal object of the idea you have of the deer. 
If you view all the three properties named to- 
gether, all three combined go to make up the 
formal object of the idea by which you repre- 
sent the nimble, graceful quadruped before you 
to your mind. The material object is the same 
throughout — the entire deer with all its attri- 
butes, properties, and qualities as it exists in the 
physical world. 

17. Difference between Idea and Phantasm. 
One more point in connection with ideas 
needs clearing up, namely, the difference between 
an idea and a phantasm. For there is danger 
of mistaking the one for the other, all the more 
as in our present state of corporeal existence, a 
phantasm in the imagination regularly accom- 
panies the idea in the mind. Phantasms are 
images of the fancy or imagination. Now since 
the fancy is an organic faculty (that is to say, a 
faculty intrinsically dependent on a bodily organ 
for the exercise of its functions), it follows 
that its activity is restricted to the representa- 
tions of sensible, individual objects. 

The idea, on the other hand, is a representa- 
tion in the intellect which is a spiritual or im- 
material faculty, i. e., a faculty intrinsically in- 



20 Truth and Error 

dependent of matter. Hence, being the product 
of a faculty of an essentially higher order than 
the imagination, the idea can also express 
spiritual things (as God, the soul), and like- 
wise universal material essences, i. e., essences of 
material objects in the abstract or shorn of their 
individualizing characteristics. 

1 8. An Objection Answered. This last re- 
mark brings to mind an objection to which it 
will be well to reply now so as to avoid confu- 
sion later on. We asserted that the idea can 
express material essences. But how is it possible 
for the idea which is spiritual in nature to ex- 
press the material? Should not the substitute 
and the thing for which it is substituted, be of 
the same character? We answer; the image 
need not be of the same nature as the thing 
imaged any more than the symbol need be of 
the same character as the thing symbolized. 
Hence an intellectual image, though neither ma- 
terial and extended, can represent the material 
and the extended. In an analogous manner, a 
mirror, though colorless itself, can nevertheless 
make the beholder see color. — This much re- 
garding the difference between the idea and the 
phantasm will suffice for the purposes of our 
treatise; an exhaustive discussion of this subject 
belongs to psychology. 

19. Judgment Defined. It still remains for 
us to say something about the other operation of 



Introductory Notions 21 

the mind, the judgment, before taking up again 
the thread of our main inquiry. 

Internal experience tells us that the mind often 
compares two objects of thought (or two objec- 
tive concepts) with a view of discovering their 
agreement or disagreement, and that if it per- 
ceives them to agree, it unites them by affirmation 
or assents to their agreement, but if it ascertains 
that they disagree, it disunites them by ne- 
gation or assents to their disagreement. The 
mental process just set forth is called judgment. 
As appears from the description given, it em- 
braces three steps, first, the comparison of two 
ideas, secondly, the perception of their agree- 
ment or disagreement, and thirdly, the assent 
to either the agreement or the disagreement. 
Various definitions of judgment have been given, 
all of which, however, at least implicitly, ex- 
press these three steps. Here are a few of 
them : " The act of the mind by which one 
thing is affirmed or denied of another " — " The 
operation by which the intellect unites two ideas 
by affirmation or disunites them by negation " — 
" The assent of the mind to the perceived 
identity or discrepancy of two objects of 
thought " — " The operation of the mind by which 
two concepts are compared with a view to dis- 
covering and declaring their agreement or disa- 
greement." 

20. Essence of the Judgment Determined. 



22 Truth and Error 

It is plain that of the three progressive move- 
ments involved in a judgment the first, the com- 
parison of two ideas, though indispensable, is 
merely preparatory to the judgment proper. 
But what about the other two requirements for 
the judgment, the perception of the agreement 
and disagreement and the assent? In which of 
them does the judgment consist, in the one or 
the other or in both? This is a question that 
has been hotly debated. There are some phi- 
losophers who hold that the judgment proper is 
constituted exclusively by the mind's assent to 
the perceived agreement or disagreement of the 
two ideas compared, and that the perception of 
the agreement or disagreement — which they 
choose to designate by the rather unusual name 
of " comparative apprehension'' — is, indeed, a 
necessary antecedent condition for pronoun- 
cing judgment, but not the judgment itself. From 
this they infer that the judgment proper or the 
mental assent is preceded by an act of percep- 
tion, but is not itself an act of perception. 
Hence the judgment can be called knowledge 
only in so far as it is an act proceeding from 
the intellect, but not in so far as it is perception. 
Thus Father Palmieri, one of the upholders of 
this theory writes : 1 " Si . . . cognitio dicitur 
apprehensio seu perceptio, actus judicii non est 

1 Anthropologia, c. 4, a. 6, thes. 36. Cf. Tongiorgi, 
Psych, n. 490-492. 



Introductory Notions 23 

formaliter cognitio, sed est essentialiter simul 
cum ea, ita ut si complete spectetur operatio 
judicantis, ea sit cognitio cum affirmatione et 
negatione ; " that is to say : " If . . . cognition 
is said to be apprehension or perception, the act 
of the judgment is not properly cognition, but 
it is essentially bound up with it, so that, if the 
operation of the judging agent is regarded ade- 
quately, it is cognition together with affirmation 
and negation." This view has met with consid- 
erable opposition, since it seems unintelligible 
how the judgment, the crowning act of the in- 
tellect, can be anything but cognition in the 
strictest sense of the term. 

Suarez's explanation seems to us more consist- 
ent with the truth ; it is adopted by a large num- 
ber of philosophers. 1 It makes the judgment 
consist in the perception of the agreement or dis- 
agreement between two ideas. That such is its 
nature will appear from the following considera- 
tions. The judgment is the act which gives full 
satisfaction to the intellect in regard to some 
point at issue, or, if you will, in regard to the 
relation existing between two ideas. For the 
judgment is the perfection of human cognition. 
(Cfr. n. 52.) Now, as consciousness tells us, the 

1 Suarez, De An. 50, c. 6, n. 4 — Lahousse, Psych, n. 
327, seq. — Van der Aa, Psych, c. 1, q. 3, a. 2, thes. 14 — • 
Liber atore, Log. n. 49 — Schiffini, Met. Spec. n. 314 — • 
Russo, Sum. Phil. n. 416 — Poland, Truth of Thought, 
n. 48 — Maher, Psych, c. 24. 



24 Truth and Error 

intellect does experience this perfect satisfac- 
tion whenever it clearly perceives the relation 
existing between two ideas ; in other words, when- 
ever it clearly apprehends the identity or diver- 
sity between subject and predicate. Hence we 
conclude that the judgment is nothing else than 
the perception of the identity or diversity be- 
tween two ideas. Nevertheless mental assent 
and the perception of identity between two< ideas 
are distinct, not indeed, in reality, but in concept. 
For when I conceive the judgment as mental as- 
sent, I draw attention to the intellectual repose 
peculiar to every judgment, a thing which I do 
not do when I regard the judgment as the per- 
ception of the agreement or disagreement be- 
tween two ideas. 

21. Division of Judgments into Immediate 
and Mediate, Analytical and Synthetical. 
Judgments are variously divided ; there are, how- 
ever, only two of these divisions that concern 
us more directly here. The first is the division 
of judgments into immediate and mediate. A 
judgment is immediate if the agreement or dis- 
agreement between two ideas is recognized im- 
mediately without the aid of a third or mediating 
idea; but it is mediate if such a mediating idea 
is needed in order to discover whether two con- 
cepts are identical or not. A judgment of this 
latter sort (as we know from Dialectics) is the 
result of the reasoning process. The other di- 



Introductory Notions 25 

vision of judgments to be considered is that into 
analytical and synthetical judgments. An 
analytical judgment is one in which the agree- 
ment or disagreement between two objects of 
thought becomes apparent by a mere analysis 
or consideration of the objects compared; if, 
however, the identity or diversity of two objects 
cannot be learned except by experience, the judg- 
ment is termed synthetical. An example of the 
first kind is, " The whole is greater than any of 
its parts/' and of the second, " The sky is blue/' 

22. Proposition. The oral expression of a 
judgment is named a proposition; it may be de- 
fined as a statement in which one thing (called 
the predicate) is affirmed or denied of another 
(called the subject). The term " is " or " is 
not " signifying the affirmation of the agreement 
or disagreement between subject and predicate 
is called the copula (i. e., link). Propositions 
are distinguished as affirmative or negative ac- 
cording as the copula is affirmative or negative. 

23. Return to Main Topic. After these 
digressions into the field of Dialectics and Psy- 
chology for the purpose of smoothing the way 
for our further investigations, let us now re- 
turn to our main topic, truth. We have com- 
pleted the explanation of the notion of logical 
truth or truth of knowledge and are now ready 
to approach the consideration of its character- 
istics. 



CHAPTER SECOND 

The Subject of Logical Truth 

ARTICLE i 

Logical Truth in the Simple Apprehension 

Summary: The question stated — Thesis — Prelimi- 
nary remarks to proof : meaning of " form " 
and " formal " in philosophy — Proof — 
Answer to objections — First objection — 
Second objection from the Sum. Theol. of 
St. Thomas — Scholium. 

24. The Question Stated. The first ques- 
tion which presents itself for solution is, 
whether logical truth belongs to all our mental 
operations. These operations may be reduced 
to two, simple apprehension and judgment. 
For, as we just pointed out, reasoning which is 
treated separately from judgment in Dialectics 
is really nothing else than a form of judgment 
pronounced with the aid of a third idea (idea 
media) introduced as a means of comparison. 
Hence the subject matter of our inquiry compre- 
hends simple apprehension and judgment, tak- 
ing the latter in a broad sense. It is generally 

26 



The Subject of Logical Truth 27, 

agreed that judgments are logically true; but it 
has been doubted whether the same can be said of 
simple apprehension. There are philosophers 1 
who believe that this mental act can lay claim 
to none but ontological truth. What their rea- 
sons for this assertion are shall be stated after 
we have explained and proved the common and 
true teaching on this subject as set forth in the 
following thesis. 

THESIS 2 

Logical truth or truth of knowledge, 
strictly so called, is found in simple 
apprehension. 

25. Preliminary Remarks to Proof : Mean- 
ing of Form and Formal in Philosophy. Be- 
fore proving our assertion, we must make a re- 
mark relative to the wording of the thesis. 

We just stated that simple apprehension can 
lay claim to logical truth in the strict sense of 
the word. This in the language of the Schools 
is sometimes expressed by saying that simple 
apprehension is " formally " true, or contains 
" formal " logical truth. It will be useful here 
to explain the signification of the terms " form," 
" formal," and " formally," as commonly used 
in scholastic philosophy. These remarks will, 
we think, prove particularly helpful, because the 

1 Cf. Vasquez, in part. I. disp. 75, c. 2 ; also Hervaeus 
and Durandus in Stiarez, disp. 8, sect. 3. 



28 Truth and Error 

ordinary meaning of these terms is so very dif- 
ferent from their technical usage. 

The outward form of a material object is, as 
we all know, one of the chief aids by which we 
distinguish one body from another. Thus you 
can readily tell a poplar from a willow, or an 
oak-leaf from an elm-leaf by their form or con- 
tour alone. This explains why the underlying 
meaning of the word " form " and its deriva- 
tives " formal " and " formally " is always that 
of something modifying, determining, discrim- 
inating, differentiating. The substratum in 
which the form inheres and which it determines 
is named " matter." Hence " matter " and 
" form " are correlatives. Thus the " formal " 
element of a musician is his practical knowledge 
of music, and the "material," the man himself; 
for the former modifies or determines the lat- 
ter. 

When we wish to express in plain English, 
what is implied by the scholastic terms " for- 
mal " and " formally," we generally make use 
of expressions such as these: "precisely," "as 
such/' " in the capacity of," " in the strict sense 
of the word," and the like. For example, where 
the scholastic philosopher would say, " Homo 
f ormaliter sumptus Deum amare valet," " Man 
taken formally is capable of loving God," the 
common man would put the same idea in words 
like the following : " Man as man is capable of 



The Subject of Logical Truth 2g 

loving God/' or, " Man as such can love God," 
or, " Man in virtue of the characteristics which 
distinguish him from mere animals possesses 
the power of loving God." Apply what we 
have just said to our present case. We asserted 
that logical truth taken " formally " is found 
in the simple apprehension. What we mean by 
this is that logical truth as such, according to 
its definition, and not merely in a metaphorical 
sense, is found in the simple apprehension. 

26. Proof of Thesis. We shall draw our 
argument for this thesis from the very nature 
of simple apprehension. 

Apprehension is the act by which the mind 
seizes on an object intellectually, or, since it 
does this by assimilating or conforming itself to 
the object, apprehension may be said to be the 
act by which the intellect becomes conformable 
to the object perceived. Now this description 
of an apprehension tallies exactly with the def- 
inition of logical truth properly so called. 

In fact, if simple apprehension were not log- 
ically true, it would thereby cease to be knowl- 
edge. For knowledge is agreement of thought 
with thing (n. 47), and this is the very defini- 
tion of logical truth. 

27. Answer to Objections. It will be well 
to strengthen our position by examining the main 
grounds upon which our opponents deny ideas 
to be (logically) true and thus put the unten- 



30 Truth and Error 

ableness of their attitude in a still clearer 
light. 

28. First Objection. The chief objection 
upon which they base their view is, that when 
the mind merely apprehends something, it does 
not know its own conformity to reality; and 
without the knowledge of this, there can be, they 
claim, no genuine logical truth. 

Now we readily grant that the intellect be- 
comes aware of its conformity to reality in the 
judgment only, and not in the simple apprehen- 
sion. (Cf. thesis 6.) This, however, does not 
argue against our position in this matter ; for the 
knowledge of that conformity, though indis- 
pensable for the perfection and full development 
of logical truth, is not required for its bare es- 
sence. To have logical truth it is enough that 
the mind should represent an object within itself, 
as it were, in a mirror. The cognition of the 
resemblance which the intellect bears to the ob- 
ject, is a feature of truth in its finished state; 
but it is no more necessary for the essential 
completeness of logical truth than is fully de- 
veloped growth for a man to be truly a human 
being. In fact, as appears from the above re- 
marks, the dispute between ourselves and our 
opponents is verbal rather than real. They take 
logical truth to be the cognized conformity of 
thought to reality. But we cannot accept their 
definition thus restricted, since it is acknowl- 



The Subject of Logical Truth 31 

edged neither by the majority of philosophers 
nor by common usage, which is, after all, the 
last court of appeal in determining the meaning 
of words. As Horace tells us, it is the " usus, 
quern penes arbitrium est et jus et norma lo- 
quendi " ; 1 that is to say, 

"It is custom, whose arbitrary sway, 
Words and the forms of words obey." 2 

Here we must add a remark to avoid confu- 
sion. We stated that the intellect becomes aware 
of its conformity to reality in the judgment only, 
and not in the simple apprehension. This does 
not mean that when the mind forms a simple 
apprehension, it is not conscious of the presence 
of the apprehension. It is one thing to be con- 
scious of the presence of an apprehension and 
another to be conscious of its conformity to real- 
ity. 

29. Second Objection from the Summa 
Theologica of St. Thomas. By way of further 
elucidation it will be well to examine an objection 
here which is sometimes urged against our view. 
It is a passage from St. Thomas in which he 
seems to say that the truth of the simple appre- 
hension is that peculiar to things or ontological 
truth. True, in purely scientific discussions the 
axiom holds, " Tantum valet auctoritas quantum 

1 Ars Poet. v. 72. 

2 Trans, by Philip Francis. 



$2 Truth and Error 

ratio/' 1. e., "The weight of a man's authority- 
counts for no more than the reasons advanced by 
him. However, this does not mean that we must 
pay no attention whatever to the authoritative 
opinions of eminent minds. If our opinions 
run counter to those of men of genius regard- 
ing matters falling within their special lines, 
fairness and good sense demand that we 
should distrust ourselves and inquire care- 
fully into the grounds for their views. Per- 
haps we shall then discover that the master has 
been misunderstood and falsely interpreted. 
Of course, it is possible that our authority was 
misled (for no mere man is infallible) ; in that 
case, we are not at liberty to follow him, but 
we are bound to depart from his teaching. Thus 
we shall avoid at once the Scylla of self-conceit 
and the Charybdis of that unreasoning adherence 
to the opinion of a leader which has found ex- 
pression in the Latin phrases " jurare in verba 
magistri " and " ipse dixit," and in the Greek 
equivalent of the latter, avrbs €</>a. 

St. Thomas has proved himself by the written 
works he has left us to be a genius of the first 
magnitude in matters philosophical; hence we 
should be very loath unless compelled by the 
weightiest reasons to depart from any of his posi- 
tive statements. As a matter of fact it would 
appear that in regard to the point under dis- 
cussion he not only does not go against us, but 



The Subject of Logical Truth 33 

he maintains the very same view we ourselves 
put forward. 

The controverted passage above referred to, 1 
runs as follows : " Veritas igitur potest 
esse in sensu vel in intellectu quod quid est, ut 
in re quadam vera, non autem ut cogmtum in 
cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri. Per- 
fectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum, 
et ideo proprie loquendo Veritas est in intellectu 
componente et dividente, non autem in sensu 
neque in intellectu quod quid est." This ex- 
tract from the " Summa Theologica " may be 
rendered thus into English : " Truth is found 
both in sense cognition and in intellectual appre- 
hension as in a certain true entity ; but in neither 
case is it something cognized by the cognizing 
agent, and this is the real meaning of truth. 
For the perfection of the intellect is truth as 
cognized by the mind; and hence strictly speak- 
ing, truth is found in the judgment, and not in 
sense cognition or mere intellectual apprehen- 
sion." According to the Angelic Doctor, there- 
fore, truth is found in simple apprehension " ut 
in re quadam vera," " as in a certain true en- 
tity." Does he then consider the truth peculiar 
to the simple apprehension to be of the onto- 
logical order (or truth of being) only? Some 
philosophers think so, but without sufficient war- 
rant. To perceive the mistake of our. opponents, 

1 Sum. Theol. p. 1, q. 16, a. 2. 



34 Truth and Error 

we must view in its context the phrase which is 
the bone of contention. Now it is plain from 
the whole drift of the foregoing citation that 
St. Thomas wishes to contrast truth as it is found 
in the judgment with truth as it exists in the 
simple apprehension. For he tells us : " Hence 
properly speaking, truth" (i.e., as cognized by 
the mind or the perfection of truth) " is found 
in the judgment and not in mere intellectual 
apprehension," because, as we shall show 
further on (n. 46), it is only through the judicial 
act that logical truth becomes the object of cog- 
nition or is cognized as such by the mind. Con- 
sequently what St. Thomas wishes to say in the 
aforenamed passage is merely this: logical 
truth does not possess the same degree of 
perfection in the simple apprehension that it does 
in the judgment, since truth of knowledge, al- 
though contained in the simple apprehension, is 
not cognized as such by means of it. Now to 
deny the perfection of logical truth to the simple 
apprehension is not the same as to say that it 
is devoid of the very essence of logical truth. — 
But why does St. Thomas choose the particular 
expression "ut in re quadam vera," to charac- 
terize the truth proper to simple apprehension? 
He does so to signify that the truth of the sim- 
ple apprehension has some points of resemblance 
with truth as found in things. For just as 
things (v. g., flowers) are necessarily conform- 



The Subject of Logical Truth 35 

able to the divine prototypal idea without, how- 
ever, being aware of this fact, so in like man- 
ner simple apprehensions are necessarily true 
representations of their objects, without at the 
same time cognizing this their conformity. 1 
(That simple apprehensions are always true will 
be established when we come to speak of error 
n. 84.)! 

30. Scholium. It is plain that simple ap- 
prehension, like any other entity, has its own 
ontological truth ; for it is a genuine or true rep- 
resentation of an object, that is to say, it is 
itself conformed to the conception of an appre- 
hension and so far forth ontologically true. 
Nor is there anything paradoxical in this as- 
sertion, since it is quite possible for an appre- 
hension to be at once conformable to a given 
type (or ontologically true), and to the object it 
represents (or logically true). For that matter, 
the same can be said of judgments, which our 
opponents admit to possess logical truth. 

1 Ci. Urraburu, Log. Maj. c. 2, a. 2, n. 15, Objec. 6. 



36 Truth and Error, 

ARTICLE 2 

Logical Truth in the Judgment 

SECTION 1 

General Criterion for the Presence of Per- 
fect Truth 

Summary: Complete mental repose an indication of 
the possession of perfect truth — Thesis — 
Proof — Requirements for mental repose — 
Thesis — Meaning of expressions "in 
actu signato " and " in actu exercito " — ■ 
Two ways in which the intellect may pos- 
sess truth — Proofs — An apparent incon- 
gruity explained. 

31. Complete Mental Repose an Indication 
of the Possession of Perfect Truth. We have 
thus far shown that simple apprehension may be 
rightly regarded as possessing all the essentials 
of logical truth. The question now arises, is it 
likewise endowed with that perfection of knowl- 
edge at which the mind aims and to which it 
can attain? This is not an easy matter to set- 
tle satisfactorily as it involves a number of 
principles each of which calls for special con- 
sideration. Hence we shall first develop these 
principles one by one and then give our answer 
to the above query. But before all we must 



The Subject of Logical Truth 37 

endeavor to find some criterion or standard 
which will enable us to tell whether the mind 
has arrived at the perfection of truth or is merely 
on the way to it. 

THESIS 3 

Complete mental repose is a sure sign 
that the intellect possesses truth in 
its fulness. 

32. Proof of Thesis. To understand the 

assertion made in the thesis we must recollect 
that the human mind is made for truth, that it 
has truth for its end. To become fully convinced 
of this we need but appeal to consciousness, 
the faithful witness of our intellectual ac- 
tivities. It tells us that we are eager for knowl- 
edge; it further informs us that we are not 
satisfied with mere knowledge of any sort, but 
that we crave for knowledge which renders us 
conscious of perceiving things as they are in 
themselves; in a word, it informs us that we 
aim at the possession of logical truth. It is 
this love of truth which rules the philosopher 
with an almost despotic hand in his search for 
the ultimate causes ; it is this love of truth which 
impels the astronomer to sweep the heavens with 
his telescope, measure and weigh distant planets 
and calculate their paths ; it is this same love 
of truth which urges the naturalist to study 



38 Truth and Error 

the book of nature spread out before him and 
to pry into the secrets of the Universe. The 
mind then craves and, as it were, hungers for 
truth; and this is a clear sign that truth is the 
object of the intellect. For the object of a fac- 
ulty is that which naturally attracts it. 

Now a faculty is never at rest until It pos- 
sesses the object of which it is in pursuit, be- 
cause it is only then that it has reached its end. 
Hence the intellect being a faculty of the soul 
will be completely at rest only when it possesses 
its object, truth, in its fulness, that is, to that 
extent to which it is capable of attaining to 
truth here on earth; and this is what we pur- 
posed to prove. 

33. Requirements for Mental Repose. We 
must next determine under what conditions the 
intellect experiences this mental repose ; for the 
perfection of knowledge depends upon these con- 
ditions. 

THESIS 4 

The mind does not rest satisfied in its 
pursuit of truth until it knows that the 
object in itself is such as represented 
by the apprehension and until more- 
over it is conscious of its own con- 
formity to the object. 

34. Meaning of Expressions " in Actu 
Signato" and "in Actu Exercito." Before 



The Subject of Logical Truth 39 

proceeding to the proof of our thesis we must 
first clear up a point closely connected with its 
right understanding, to wit, the meaning of the 
turns of speech, " to know logical truth ' in actu 
signato ' and * in actu exercito ' " ; for these two 
stock-in-trade phrases of logicians will fre- 
quently occur in our subsequent disquisitions. 
We shall first assign the general and obvious im- 
port of the expressions " in actu signato " and 
" in actu exercito," and then see how they are 
to be understood when employed in connection 
with logical truth.—" Signato " is derived from 
the Latin " signare/' the radical meaning of 
which is " to mark by words or gestures," " to 
express or designate." Hence we are said to 
manifest something " in actu signato " when we 
manifest it by means of words or some other 
external sign. We are said to manifest some- 
thing " in actu exercito " when we manifest it 
not by word of mouth, but by the performance 
or exercise of some action. Thus, to illustrate 
these general statements by an example or two: 
Our Divine Lord taught us the way to heaven 
" in actu signato " when seated on the Mount 
in the midst of the listening multitudes, he 
showed them the path to a better world by the 
words of wisdom that fell from his sacred lips. 
But when raised aloft on the cross on Mount 
Calvary, he pointed out the road to never-ending 
bliss " in actu exercito," by his deeds or acts of 



40 Truth and Error 

patience, humility, fortitude, and all the other 
virtues which he there displayed. To take an- 
other less dignified instance; when you are 
thirsty, you may tell me so in plain words — " in 
actu signato " — " I am thirsty " ; or you may 
convey the same knowledge to me by the eager- 
ness with which you snatch up a tumbler of 
water and toss it off. Thus you tell me " in 
actu exercito," by your way of acting, that you 
are thirsty. 

This then is the original or radical import of 
these phrases. They are, however, sometimes 
taken in a somewhat wider sense, " in actu sig- 
nato " denoting the same as " directly," " ex- 
pressly," " explicitly," etc., and " in actu ex- 
ercito " being equivalent to " indirectly," " im- 
plicitly," "tacitly," and the like. 

Now to apply these remarks to the subject of 
logical truth. I know logical truth " in actu 
signato " when I perceive the truth of my cog- 
nition or the mind's conformity to reality di- 
rectly or by an explicit judgment. Thus were I 
to say to myself, " The judgment of mine that 
the earth revolves round the sun, is true," I 
would make the mind's conformity to reality the 
express object of my thought and hence would 
perceive it " in actu signato," directly, and as it 
were, in express mental terms. If, however, 
instead of turning my intellectual gaze inward 
upon my own judgment by reflection, I consider 



The Subject of Logical Truth 41; 

directly the object of the judgment, yet so as to 
perceive, in the very exercise of the judicial act, 
the mind's correspondence with the object — I 
am said to know logical truth indirectly, " in actu 
exercito," in the exercise of the direct act. In 
this case, I do not pronounce judgment expressly 
on the mind's conformity to reality ; I do so only 
implicitly, and, as it were, tacitly. Thus — to 
take up once more the example given before — I 
have come to the conclusion that the earth re- 
volves around the sun. It is this truth regarded 
in itself which interests me first and foremost ; yet 
while keeping my mental gaze fixed upon it, I, 
at the same time, as it were, stealthily, glance 
at my own mind and perceive that my cognition 
is conformable to reality. It is in this way that 
the general meaning of the phrases " in actu sig- 
nato " and " in actu exercito " must be taken 
when applied to logical truth. 

35. Two Ways in which the Intellect May 
Possess Truth. There is still another point to 
which we must call attention before we pass to 
the proofs of the thesis, namely the two ways 
in which the intellect may possess truth; for it 
may either be merely conformable to the object 
perceived without cognizing its own conformity, 
or it may, in addition, be conscious of this its 
conformity. In the former case, truth is simply 
a property or condition of the intellect; it merely 
" inheres " in the intellect, as the schoolmen say ; 



42 Truth and Error 

in the latter case, it is likewise the object of the 
mind, or, in scholastic phrase, it is " objectively " 
in the mind. Thus, to make oilr meaning clear 
by an illustration — a boy may possess a certain 
endowment, e. g., a talent for music or oratory 
without being aware of its possession, or he may 
at once have the endowment and know that he 
has it. 

36. Proof of First Part of Thesis. We now 
pass to the proof of the thesis. It has two parts ; 
in the first part we assert that the mind does not 
rest satisfied until it knows the thing to be in 
itself such as conceived by the mind ; in other 
words, until it knows that what it is thinking of 
exists independently of cognition. To show 
this, we need only consult our experience re- 
garding our intellectual states, as made known 
to us by that infallible witness of what goes on 
in our souls, our consciousness. This tells us 
that the mind when in search after truth is never 
at rest until it knows that an object is in itself 
such as it is represented by the intellect, or, if 
you will, until it knows that the entity known has 
being in the real order, and hence independent 
of thought.-* To throw a little more light on this 
rather abstruse point, take an example. Sup- 
pose some one were to give expression in your 
presence to the ideas of " noble-minded " and 
" interesting," the questions would at once force 
themselves upon, you : " Who is noble-minded? " 



The Subject of Logical Truth 43 

" What is interesting ? " This is a sign that your 
intellect is not satisfied with those two ideas 
alone, and it is not satisfied because those two 
ideas merely set some attributes before your 
mind without at the same time telling you that 
anything is such and such in the real order. But 
if your inquiry is answered by the information 
that " your friend is noble-minded " or that " the 
latest opera is interesting/' your mind is at rest 
in regard to the two ideas that aroused your 
curiosity; for you now refer the attributes ex- 
pressed by the two ideas of " noble-minded " and 
of "interesting" to their respective subjects 
" your friend " and " the latest opera," and thus 
you know that something is such and such in 
reality or in the ontological order. (Cf. n. 43.) 

37. Another Proof. It will be of help to 
the declaration of the thesis to subjoin a brief a 
priori argument to the a posteriori proof just 
given. 

The intellect from its very nature is capable 
of knowing things as they are in themselves. 
It is by means of this capacity that intellectual 
knowledge excels mere sensitive cognition. 
Hence the intellect cannot be fully satisfied unless 
it does know things in themselves. For the full 
satisfaction of a faculty consists in the exercise 
of its highest function. 

We have shown, then, that for the mind to be 
altogether tranquil, it must know that the thing 



44 Truth and Error 

in itself is such as it is represented. However, 
such knowledge, though required, is not of itself 
alone sufficient to quiet the mind. This brings 
us to the second part of the thesis in which we 
assert that for the intellect to be fully at ease, 
it must know that it knows the thing as it is 
apart from cognition, in other words, it must 
be aware of its own conformity to reality, or, 
if you will, logical truth itself must become the 
object of cognition. 

38. Proof of Second Part of Thesis. We 
prove the second part of the thesis thus: Man 
— as is generally admitted and as is accurately 
set forth in psychology — is possessed of the 
power of self-reflection in the highest sense of 
the word. Hence knowledge of the truth with- 
out a reflex knowledge of that knowledge is an 
intellectual act which stops half-way, and there- 
fore falls short of the perfection proper to the 
human intellect. Consequently, in order that the 
mind may rest fully satisfied in the attainment 
of truth, it must be conscious of its own con- 
formity to reality ; in other words, it must know 
that it knows. Hence whenever I make any 
certain statement, " as I know " is always con- 
tained in it. 

St. Thomas confirms the stand we have taken 
when he says : 1 " Perf ectio intellectus est 
verum ut cognitum," that is, " The perfection of 

1 Sum. Theol. p. 1, q. 16, a. 2. 



The Subject of Logical Truth 45 

the intellect is truth known as such." (Cf. n. 
29.) These words of the Angelic Doctor might 
be paraphrased by a citation from Cardinal New- 
man. True, the Cardinal in the passage we are 
about to quote speaks expressly of certitude, 
but as certitude is practically the same with per- 
fect logical truth (see n. 60), the extract is quite 
to the point. Here is what he says : * " Certi- 
tude ... is the perfection of a truth with the 
perception that it is a truth, or the consciousness 
of knowing as expressed in the phrase, ' I know 
that I know/ or ' I know that I know that I 
know/ or simply ' I know ' ; for one reflex as- 
sertion of the mind about self sums up the series 
of self-consciousness without the need of any 
actual evolution of them." 

39. An Apparent Xnpongruity Explained. 
We find it necessary to draw attention here to 
an apparent incongruity in the exposition of our 
doctrine, which unless removed might envelop 
the proofs of this and of the preceding thesis 
in an unwelcome haze. 

We have stated again and again that the hu- 
man mind rests satisfied when in the full and 
perfect possession of truth. But how can this 
be? Is not the full possession of truth peculiar 
to the omniscient God alone? And is not man's 
craving for truth, at least so long as he lives 
upon earth, insatiable? When I have satisfied 

1 Grammar of Assent, Crown Edition, p. 197. 



46 Truth and Error, 

myself on one question are not a number of 
others at once suggested by the solution of that 
very question? How then can all our former 
assertions stand? Are they not built on sand? 
The objection rests on a misunderstanding. 
For when we say that truth is found complete 
in the judgment or that the mind rests fully sat- 
isfied when it possesses truth in its perfection, 
we do not mean to assert that we can ever know 
a subject exhaustively, or that we can ever ar- 
rive at a stage of knowledge beyond which we 
do not care to pass. No, what we want to ex- 
press by these and similar turns of speech is, 
that in a true judgment the mind is fully con- 
formed to a thing under a certain aspect, namely 
in regard to the " formal object" expressed by 
the predicate, and that it perceives its conformity 
clearly. Thus when I state in technical lan- 
guage, "[The judgment, a deer is a graceful 
animal, contains truth in its fulness or perfec- 
tion," I mean to say no more than this : " I 
clearly perceive my mind's conformity to a deer 
as regards the attributes expressed by the predi- 
cate of the judgment." All else lies beyond my 
present scope of investigation. 



The Subject of Logical Truth 47 



SECTION 2 

Conditions for Perfect Truth Obtain in 
the Judgment Alone 

Summary: First condition for perfect truth — Thesis 
— Preliminary remarks — Proof — Con- 
firmation — Process of attaining to perfec- 
tion of truth — An objection — Inclusion of 
predicate in the subject — Second condi- 
tion for perfect truth — Thesis — Prelim- 
inary remarks : various meanings of knowl- 
edge — Proof of first part — Another form 
of this proof — Proofs of second part. 

40. First Condition for Perfect Truth. We 

must now go a step further and ascertain in 
what operation of the mind the conditions for 
the perfection of truth are fulfilled. 



THESIS 5 

It is in the judgment, and not in the 
simple apprehension, that we know an 
object to be such in itself as we con- 
ceive it. 

The thesis might also be expressed in other 
words thus: It is through the judgment alone 
that an object is known to be such in reality as 
it is conceived, or, briefly, it is through the judg- 



48 Truth and Error 

ment alone that an object is cognized as objec- 
tively real. 

In developing this thesis we shall first give our 
reasons in its support and then point out by what 
process the mind when pronouncing judgment 
cognizes an object as objectively real. 

41. Proof of Thesis. To bring home to 
ourselves this superiority of the judgment over 
the simple apprehension (or idea) we must again 
appeal to consciousness. For we are here deal- 
ing with mental phenomena which can become 
known to us by consciousness alone. Let us 
take a simple case and analyze it. Suppose you 
conceive the two ideas " sweet " and " sugar." 
You, indeed, behold the two objects before your 
mind's eye, but whether they are anything in the 
real order, these ideas alone do not tell you any 
more than the compound notion " winged horse " 
informs you of the reality of the thing repre- 
sented by it. As soon, however, as you form the 
judgment, " Sugar is sweet," you know at once 
that the object called " sugar," as it is in itself 
apart from the intellect possesses the property 
expressed by the predicate " sweet." 

In confirmation of the foregoing statement we 
quote a sentence from Father Van der Aa, S. J., 
in which he summarizes 1 the opinion of certain 
philosophers in these words : " In judicio mens 
perceptionem suam refert ad ordinem objecti- 

iLogica Objectiva, c. I, q. I, prop. 4. n. 3. 



The Subject of Logical Truth 49 

vum; unde dicendo explicite v. g., 'toto minor 
est pars/ dico implicite : ■ et hoc ita est in ordine 
objectivo ' ; " which may be thus translated into 
English: "In a judgment the mind refers its 
own perception to the objective order of things; 
hence when I say explicitly, e. g., ' the part is 
less than the whole ' I say implicitly, ' and this is 
so in the objective order.' " Even philosophers 
otherwise not partial to scholasticism regard the 
judgment in the same light. For instance, Mr. 
F. H. Bradly 1 says : " The judgment refers off 
one compound idea to the region of reality." 
" Thus/' comments Father Rickaby 2 on this as- 
sertion, " ' The wolf is eating the lamb/ is inter- 
preted as assigning over to reality the compound 
notion of wolf-eating-lamb; wolf-eating is a 
reality or fact." 

42. Confirmation of Thesis. We might 
still further corroborate our contention by an 
inspection of the nominal definition of the phrase 
" simple apprehension." For a good definition of 
a word tells us what the thing signified by the 
word is held to be by men in general, or, at least, 
by those competent to judge. Now simple appre- 
hension is often described as the operation by 
which the mind merely expresses what a thing is 
without giving us any further information re- 
garding it. 3 According to this definition, then, 

1 The Principles of Logic, cc. 1 and 2. 

2 The First Principles of Knowledge, I.e. 
s Pesch, Inst. Log. v. 2, p. 797. 



50 Truth and Error: 

simple apprehension only makes known to us 
what elements go to constitute a thing, but it 
leaves us in ignorance, whether the thing is so in 
the real order. Now, as a matter of fact, we do 
know things to be such in the real order as we 
conceive them, and as we do not become aware of 
this by means of the simple apprehension — for 
it shows us merely the attributes which make 
up a certain object — we must do so by means 
of the other operation of the mind, the judg* 
ment. 

43. Process of Attaining to Perfection of 
Knowledge. It now remains to show how the 
mind arrives at the perfection of knowledge 
through the judgment. To make this point 
clear let us resolve the judgment into its constit- 
uent elements; they are the subject, the predi- 
cate, and the copula. Of these elements the 
subject stands for the thing as it is in itself, the 
predicate expresses the attributes by means of 
which I know the subject or represent it to my- 
self, and the copula declares the subject and the 
predicate to be identical. Now it is thus, namely 
by identifying the subject (the thing in itself) 
with the predicate (what I know of the subject) 
by means of the copula that I know a thing to 
be in itself such as it is conceived by the mind. 

To explain by an example; when I pronounce 
the judgment " Patrick Henry is a distinguished 
American orator," I identify " Patrick Henry " 



The Subject of Logical Truth 51 

— a reality existing in the objective order of 
things — and " distinguished American orator n 

— something I know of that reality; and it is 
in this manner that I know Patrick Henry to be 
in the objective order of things as I represent 
him to myself. (In the explanation just given 
we have restricted ourselves to affirmative judg- 
ments for the sake of simplicity; but the same 
holds true of negative judgments, " mutatis mu- 
tandis.") 

But how do I know that in a judgment the 
subject stands for the thing as it is in itself, and 
the predicate, for some attribute by means of 
which I know the subject or represent it to my- 
self? I reply, I know this through conscious- 
ness, as an analysis of any judgment will show. 
For when I affirm e. g., " Grass is green," I mean 
to say merely this, " The objective reality called 
* grass ' possesses the property represented by 
the idea which the term * green ' signifies." 

44. An Objection. But here we are con- 
fronted by an objection. We have said repeat- 
edly that in judgments we know things as objec- 
tively real. This, however, does not seem to be 
universally the case. For example the propo- 
sition, " A triangle is a figure bounded by three 
sides," is true even though no triangle ever ex- 
isted ; and the statement, " Man is a sentient, 
rational being," was true even before the advent 
of man. In neither of these instances do we 



$2 Truth and Error 

conceive anything as objectively real, and yet 
both these judgments are true. Are not these 
and similar exceptions fatal to our position in 
this matter? 

Our reply is, they would be if they were genu- 
ine and not merely apparent exceptions. For 
the objection supposes that through the judg- 
ment we always cognize things as physically real 
or as actually existent; we do not say this. All 
we maintain is that through the judgment we 
know things as pertaining to the objective or 
ontological order. Now the ontological order is 
opposed to the order of mere cognition (the 
" intentional " order). Whatever has being or 
is something independently of thought belongs 
to the ontological order of things, even though 
it does not exist actually, but is merely something 
possible. Hence whenever I conceive anything 
as opposed to myself, the thinking agent, or as 
contradistinguished from my cognition, I con- 
ceive it as pertaining to the ontological order, 
and therefore as real or (more explicitly) as ob- 
jectively real. That such usage of the term 
" real " is not foreign to the English language, is 
borne out by our Dictionaries. Thus, the " Cen- 
tury Dictionary " gives the following as some of 
the meanings of " real " taken philosophically : 
" Pertaining to things, and not to words or 
thought only," — " being independent of any per- 
son's thought about the subject," — " not result- 



The Subject of Logical Truth 53 

ing from the mind's action, opposed to imaginary 
or intentional." 

Note, however, by way of caution, when we 
say that an object is known as objectively real 
in the judgment only, our meaning is not that 
the content expressed by the simple apprehen- 
sion is not real. It is. Only it is not cognized 
as real by means of the simple apprehension. 

45. Inclusion of the Predicate in the Sub- 
ject. The question here naturally suggests 
itself whether the subject expresses the predi- 
cate and to what extent. To this we reply with 
a distinction. When we have to do with syn~ 
thetical judgments, i. e., judgments resting on 
experience, the idea of the subject is altogether 
silent about the predicate. Thus the subject 
" Henry " in the proposition, " Henry is sing- 
ing," in no way includes the predicate " sing- 
ing," which lies entirely outside the subject 
" Henry." In analytical judgments the case is 
different; in these, the idea of the subject does, 
in some way, involve the predicate, not, how- 
ever, distinctly, but in a vague manner. Thus 
when I say, " Every contingent existence must 
have a cause," the subject, " contingent exist- 
ence," contains the notion " having a cause," 
not, indeed, expressly, but by implication. 
And this is just what we should expect. For 
the purpose of the subject is merely to take the 
place of an object as existing in the sphere of 



54 Truth and Error 

reality. It is the predicate that furnishes the 
information regarding the subject, or expresses 
clearly and definitely what the subject intimates 
at best only dimly. 

46. Second Condition for Perfect Truth. 
We have proved then that in the judgment we 
know an object to be such in itself as we con- 
ceive it ; and this is the first of the two conditions 
to be satisfied in order that the mind may be 
fully at rest in the possession of truth. It re- 
mains for us to show that the other condition 
for complete repose in truth (cf. thesis 4), is 
likewise satisfied in the judgment. This we 
shall do in the next thesis. 

THESIS 6 

It is in the judgment, and in the judg- 
ment alone, that the mind knows that 
it knows. 

47. Introductory Remarks: Various Mean- 
ings of Knowledge. Before we enter upon the 
proofs of the thesis, it may not be amiss to ex- 
amine a little more closely into the meaning of 
the words " knowledge " and " knowing." x 
This investigation will aid us in a clearer under- 
standing of the question at issue into which the 
concept of knowledge enters as an integral part. 

1 Cf. Lahousse, Psych, n. 150; Pesch, Inst. Log. v. 2, 
n. 0b. 



The Subject of Logical Truth 55 

Knowledge, in general, is the assimilation of 
the mind to the object apprehended, or, if you 
will, it consists in this that the intellect con- 
forms itself to an object by expressing that ob- 
ject within itself. Now knowledge may be 
threefold according to the less or greater per- 
fection of the mental assimilation. There may 
be merely intellectual conformity to the object 
unaccompanied by any affirmation or negation; 
or the mental conformity may be of such a char- 
acter that by means of it the mind perceives and 
affirms something to be so or not to be so; or 
lastly, this same mental conformity may more- 
over render the intellect conscious of its assimi- 
lation to the object. 

Lest these various meanings of knowledge 
seem arbitrarily devised by us and not accord- 
ing to the customary use of the vernacular, it 
will be well to bring forward our warrants for 
them from two of our best dictionaries, the 
"Standard" and the " Century." Thus the 
" Standard " says : " Knowledge is the agree- 
ment of thought with thing." These words de- 
fine the lowest degree of knowledge. It further 
states : " It is of the very essence of knowledge 
that it apprehends or cognizes its object to be." 
This is a description of the next step in the ac- 
quisition of knowledge. And lastly, we are told 
by the same authority : " Knowledge is the con- 
viction or assurance, arising from evidence that 



56 Truth and Error 

our mental apprehension or perception agrees 
with reality "; or as the Century puts it more 
briefly: "To know means to be conscious of 
perceiving the truth/' Here we meet with a 
clear and concise account of knowledge in its 
highest perfection. 

48. Proof of First Part of Thesis. We now 
pass to the proof of the thesis. We shall di- 
vide it into two parts: in the first part we shall 
point out that in a judgment the intellect not 
only knows things, but also that it knows that it 
knows them; and in the second part we shall 
show the contrary to be the case in a simple 
apprehension. 

Our argument proceeds thus: In a judgment 
the intellect affirms something to be such and 
such, e. g., the rose to be sweet-smelling. But it 
could not do this unless it knew, at least implicitly, 
its own conformity to reality. For if such knowl- 
edge did not accompany the intellectual percep- 
tion, in so far our judgment would be blind, and 
hence irrational and unworthy of man. But to 
say that the intellect cognizes its own conformity 
to reality is the same as to say that it knows 
that it knows. For conformity of the mind to 
reality is knowledge. In the judgment then the 
intellect knows that it knows. 

St. Thomas expresses the same thought by 
saying that truth is found in the judgment " ut 



The Subject of Logical Truth 5£ 

cognitum in cognoscente," 1 or in English, " as 
cognized by the cognizing agent." 

Of course, what ultimately enables the mind 
to perceive its assimilation to the object of 
thought is the evidence of the truth affirmed. 
For all true knowledge hinges in the last resort 
on objective evidence. 

As stated in the proof, in order to know that we 
know we need not advert to the mind's conformity 
with reality explicitly (in actu signato) ; we can 
cognize this conformity sufficiently by an im- 
plicit act of cognition (in actu exercito). For 
the human intellect is so constituted that by one 
and the same act it knows directly that a thing 
is so, and indirectly, that it is conscious of the 
correctness of its knowledge. 

What we have said of affirmative judgments 
applies, of course, to negative judgments as well. 
For when we make a denial, we assert directly 
that something is not so, and indirectly, that our 
minds judge correctly that it is not so. 

49. Another Form of the Proof. - The first 
part of our thesis might also be presented in an- 
other form thus: As was stated before, the 
subject of a judgment stands for a thing as it is 
in itself, and the predicate stands for the same 
thing as conceived by the mind. Hence when 
in making a judgment I refer the predicate to 

1 Sum. Theo., p. 1, q. 16, a. 2. 



58 Truth and Error 

the subject, I perceive the identity between a 
thing as conceived and the same thing as it is in 
itself, and so I come to know that my mind is 
conformable to the thing as it is in itself. To 
illustrate this rather abstruse argument by an 
example: If I know a certain photograph to 
be an exact likeness of the dome of St. Peter's 
in Rome, I likewise know that my mind which 
conceives an idea from the photograph is thus 
conformable to that dome as it is in itself. 

50. Two Proofs for the Second Part of the 
Thesis. It still remains for us to show that 
the simple apprehension falls short of that per- 
fection of knowledge which we have shown to 
belong to the judgment. This follows as a 
corollary from the preceding thesis. For as we 
saw there, it is in the judgment alone that the 
mind can know a thing to be such in itself as 
it is conceived, and hence it is in the judgment 
alone, and not in the simple apprehension, that 
the mind is able to refer its own knowledge to 
the thing as it is in itself. 

We can likewise arrive at the same conclu- 
sion by a direct appeal to consciousness. For 
as this witness of our intellectual phenomena in- 
forms us, a mere apprehension or idea simply 
renders a thing present to the mind, but it tells 
us nothing as to whether the mind is or is not 
conformable to the thing as it is in itself. Thus 
the idea of a broken stick, which I formed on 



The Subject of Logical Truth 59 

seeing a stick plunged into the water, merely puts 
a certain object before my mind, but it in no 
way expresses whether there is anything outside 
the intellect corresponding to my idea of broken 
stick. 

SECTION 3 
Perfection of Truth in the Judgment Alone 

Summary: The question stated — Proof — Confirma- 
tion from St. Thomas — An abridged form 
of proof — Corollary — Scholium — Pre- 
liminary remarks : the term " sign " ex- 
plained — Second proof' — An objection — 
Difference between logical truth and certi- 
tude — Difference between the repose in 
perfect truth and the repose in certitude. 

51. The Question Stated. We now come 
to the final step in this discussion for which all 
that has been hitherto said may be regarded as 
a preparation. 

THESIS 7 

Truth of knowledge reaches its high- 
est perfection in the judgment, and in 
the judgment alone. 

52. Proof. This statement is proved thus: 
Truth of knowledge reaches its highest perfec- 
tion, when the mind is fully conformed to an 
object in so far as that object is apprehended, 



60 Truth and Error 

or, in other words, when the process of intel- 
lectual assimilation to a certain aspect of an ob- 
ject has been carried as far as it can be carried. 
Now we have proved (thesis 3) that when the 
mind finds complete rest in its strivings after 
truth, intellectual assimilation has been pushed 
to its utmost limit. We have further shown 
(thesis 4) that the intellect does not enjoy this 
perfect repose until it perceives a thing to be 
such and such in reality and until it cognizes its 
own conformity to the real order of things; in 
other words, until it knows that it knows. 
Now these conditions for full mental repose are 
fulfilled in the judicial act alone, and not in the 
simple apprehension, as appears from theses "7 
and 8. Therefore we conclude that in the judg- 
ment alone truth of knowledge reaches its high- 
est perfection; the simple apprehension contains 
truth, as it were, in germ; but in the judgment 
that truth comes into full bloom. 

In the major premise of our proof we require 
for perfect (logical) truth mental conformity to 
the object "in so far as the object is appre- 
hended," or conformity " to a certain aspect, 
phase or view of the object." These restric- 
tions of the object of knowledge emphasize the 
fact that to arrive at the perfection of truth, 
it is enough for the mind to be fully conformed 
to the so-called " formal object of an idea " or 
to "the object as apprehended by the mind"; 



The Subject of Logical Truth 61 

conformity to " the material object of thought/' 
i. e., to the object as it is in itself with all its 
properties and qualities, is neither necessary for 
the possession of truth nor, in most cases, pos- 
sible. 

53. Confirmation from St. Thomas. To 
sum up in the words of St. Thomas all 
that we have hitherto said : * " Perf ectio enim 
intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, 
proprie loquendo, Veritas est in intellectu com- 
ponente et dividente, non autem in sensu 
neque in intellectu quod quid est"; that is to 
say : " The intellect has reached its perfect 
state when it knows (logical) truth; and, hence, 
properly speaking, truth is found in the judg- 
ment, but not in sensation nor in the simple 
apprehension." (Cf. n. 29.) 

54. Abridged Form of Proof. The preced- 
ing argument may be given in an abridged form 
thus : The perfection of logical truth is reached 
when the mind's restlessness in its search after 
some truth is stilled. Now, as a mere appeal to 
consciousness tells us, this takes place in the 
judgment and in the judgment alone. — This 
mode of arguing is conclusive, but as it disre- 
gards the grounds of the intellect's repose in the 
possession of truth, it is less thorough and hence 
less philosophical. 

55. Corollary. We infer as a consequence 

1 Sum. Theol. p. I, q. 16, a. 2. 



62 Truth and Error 

from our thesis that in every judgment the 
mind reflects at least implicitly (in actu exercito) 
upon its own state. Because, as we often stated 
before, in judging we know that we know, and 
our knowledge cannot thus become the object 
of our thought without some exercise of reflec- 
tion. 

56. Scholium. It might be useful to call 
attention here to the difference between a judg- 
ment and a compound idea (strictly so called), 
between " Socrates is a philosopher " and " the 
philosopher Socrates " : on account of some 
points of resemblance between the two they 
may be easily confounded, as has been actually 
done by several modern writers who choose to 
regard the judgment merely as a combination or 
fusion of two ideas. This Mansel would seem 
to do when he defines a judgment as " a com- 
bination of two concepts, related to one or more 
common objects of possible intuition." 1 The 
difference between judgments and compound 
ideas may be stated thus: When forming a 
compound idea, the mind simply juxtaposes two 
ideas — puts one alongside the other; but when 
it judges, it moreover affirms the one of the 
other, it perceives and declares them to be 
identical, or, if you will, a compound idea rep- 
resents together two (or more) attributes, which 
may be, or, in point of fact, are identical; but 

1 Prolegom. Log. p. 60. 



The Subject of Logical Truth 63 

here it stops short, it does not proceed to repre- 
sent them as identical and to pronounce them 
to be so; this is done only in the judgment. 
Hence we see that there is a vast difference be- 
tween a judgment and a mere compound idea. 

57. Preliminary Remarks to Second Argu- 
ment : The Term " Sign " Explained. We sub- 
join a second argument of the thesis drawn from 
the " sign " or oral expression of ideas and judg- 
ments. But in order to appreciate the force 
of the proof we are about to give, we must first 
say a few words about the notion of " sign " in 
general and its relation to what it signifies. 

A sign according to the ordinary acceptation 
of the word is anything that represents to the 
mind something distinct from itself. Thus 
smoke and laughter are signs, the former of 
fire and the latter of mirth. That characteristic 
of a sign which enables it to suggest to the cogni- 
tive faculty something distinct from itself is 
styled its power of signifying. Some signs 
possess this power from their very nature and 
hence are called natural signs, whilst others have 
received this same power from men by common 
agreement and hence have been styled conven- 
tional signs. Thus smoke and laughter indi- 
cate fire and mirth respectively of their own na- 
ture, independently of the will of man ; and it is 
on this account that they are understood by any 
one endowed with reason. Examples of con- 



64 Truth and Error 

ventional signs are the flags of different nations, 
the ringing of bells for various purposes, and 
especially the spoken word. 

Since a sign is of this nature, it shows both 
what a thing is and what it is not. To explain 
our meaning by a few illustrations : The hunts- 
man can readily tell from the footprints left in 
the snow whether the animal the trail of which 
he sees before him had hoofs or claws or was 
web-footed. — If the impress of a signet ring 
fails to show a wreath or coronet in the sealing 
wax we are entitled to infer that neither the 
one nor the other of these devices is engraved on 
the seal. — These two instances are instances of 
natural signs; but as our argument turns on 
words and propositions, both conventional signs, 
let us add an example of that kind of sign. The 
flag of the United States of our day (1913) 
displays forty-eight stars in the upper corner next 
to the flagstaff, indicative of the number of 
States at present in the Union. Should you ever 
happen to see the flag of an earlier date, say 
of the year 1777, you may observe that it bears 
only thirteen stars in the field, thus showing that 
the number of States was then only thirteen. 
Hence our national symbol, both by the presence 
of certain marks and the absence of others, gives 
you information in regard to the present and the 
past condition of the country, e. g., it tells you 
that now there are forty- eight States in the Union 



The Subject of Logical Truth 65 

and no more, and that in 1777 the States num- 
bered thirteen and no more. 

Let us now pass from the symbol of our coun- 
try to words and propositions, the symbols of 
thought and see what argument we can build on 
them for the purpose of our proof. 

58. Second Proof of Thesis. We know 
from experience that it is impossible for one 
mind to hold immediate communication with an- 
other. No one can unveil his thoughts to his 
fellowmen without the intervention of external 
signs of some sort. The ordinary intermedi- 
aries between mind and mind are words and 
propositions; they are, so to speak, the repre- 
sentatives of our mental acts, the messengers of 
our thoughts. " Habes animi nuntia verba 
mei," says Ovid. 1 This being so, we are justi- 
fied in concluding from what is or is not con- 
tained in words and propositions to what is or 
is not contained in our thoughts. Now any man 
of common sense will tell you that when you 
pronounce a number of detached words, you 
say nothing that is either true or false. He will 
tell you that the words you utter one after an- 
other without connecting them by the copula 
" is " and " is not," call up certain images in 
his mind, and nothing more. As soon, how- 
ever, as you combine your words into proposi- 
tions, he will declare your statements to be true 

iHer. 16, 10. 



66 Truth and Error 

or false or dubious. Suppose you hear some 
one pronounce in succession the following terms, 
" mercy "— " strained "— " gentle "— " rain "— 
" place "— " twice "— " blessed "— " him " . . . 
you will understand the meaning of the words 
uttered, but you will not think that the speaker 
has given expression either to a truth or a false- 
hood. But note the difference when those words 
are joined into sentences as follows: 



" The quality of Mercy is not strain'd, 
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven, 
Upon the place beneath. It is twice bless'd; 
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes." 



We have here one of the truest delineations 
of the excellence of Mercy in all literature. 

Since then propositions (the signs of judg- 
ments) do, and words (the signs of ideas) do 
not beget the knowledge which we regard as true 
in the highest sense of the word, we rightly in- 
fer that judgments alone possess that conform- 
ity with reality which can be dignified with the 
title of truth " par excellence." 

59. An Objection. But, some one might 
ask, is it universally true that a sign expresses 
all that is in the thing signified? It would not 
seem so. Take the case of the sealing wax; it 
does not express e. g., that the signet ring is made 
of bronze. Hence, might not ideas possess per- 



The Subject of Logical Truth 67 

feet truth, even though words, their signs, do 
not indicate it? 

To this we answer that a genuine sign must 
and does express all that of which it is the sign, 
but no more. The impression in the sealing wax 
is the sign of the figures and characters in the 
ring, and not of the material of which the ring 
is made. Thus, in like manner, words and 
propositions are signs of the truth which is in 
the mind. This is apparent from the fact that 
we can communicate to others such truth as our 
ideas and judgments possess if we choose to do 
so. Now such a thing would be impossible if 
speech did not faithfully convey the truth of our 
cognitions to those we address; for as we can- 
not look into other people's minds directly, there 
is but one way of holding intellectual intercourse 
with them, namely by means of language. 

60. Difference between Logical Truth and 
Certitude. To avoid confusion and misunder- 
standing we wish to call attention here to the 
difference between logical truth and certitude; 
for the two stand in very close relationship. 

Logical truth in general is a broader term than 
certitude. For certitude is proper to the judg- 
ment alone, but logical truth is found in the 
simple apprehension as well. Further a judg- 
ment may be true without being certain, but it 
cannot be certain without being true. 

As regards perfect logical truth, however, the 



68 Truth and Error 

case is otherwise. Perfect logical truth and 
certitude are, in point of fact, the same mental 
state; they differ from each other only in the 
manner in which this mental state is viewed. 
For perfect logical truth is the clear knowledge 
of the mind's conformity to reality, and certitude 
is the firm mental adherence to a judgment with- 
out any dread of error. Now whenever the in- 
tellect in a judgment knows itself to be in ac- 
cord with reality, it necessarily adheres to that 
judgment firmly and with entire assurance. We 
might therefore say that perfect logical truth, of 
its very nature, implies certitude, and certitude 
essentially presupposes perfect logical truth. 
The two consequently denote the same intellec- 
tual condition with this only difference, that per- 
fect logical truth emphasizes the mind's con- 
formity to reality, and certitude lays stress on 
the firm mental adherence to a judgment ex- 
pressive of reality. 

61. Difference between the Repose in Truth 
and the Repose in Certitude. In this connection 
another question touching the difference between 
perfect logical truth and certitude might be pro- 
posed. Is the quiet of mind by which perfect 
logical truth as well as certitude are recognized, 
the same in both instances or not? We an- 
swer, it is not. For the quiet of mind accom- 
panying the full possession of logical truth, re- 
sults from the attainment of the object aimed at 



The Subject of Logical Truth 69 

and implies a cessation of further striving or ex- 
ertion; while the quiet peculiar to certitude, fol- 
lows upon the exclusion of doubt or fear of 
error, and hence should rather be called intel- 
lectual security or assurance. To illustrate: 
A traveler on completing his journey feels satis- 
faction both because the continued exertions in- 
cident to his travel are at an end, and also be- 
cause he has not gone astray and missed his 
destination. The former satisfaction corre- 
sponds to the quiet the mind experiences at hav- 
ing fully attained its object, truth, and the lat- 
ter, to the security the intellect feels on knowing 
that it is not mistaken. 



CHAPTER THIRD 
Degrees of Logical Truth 

Summary: Introductory remarks — Truth in itself 
without degrees — Thesis — Proof — In 
what sense ideas and judgments admit de- 
grees — Thesis — Preliminary remarks to 
proof — Proof — Scholium — Sense in 
which judgments can become false — De- 
grees in the (subjective) source of truth 

— Thesis — Proof — Limitation of thesis 

— Meaning of intellectual light — Critical 
examination of views of opponents — Evo- 
lution of knowledge — Infinite knowledge 
incapable of evolution. 

62. Introductory Remarks. Our previous 
investigations have led us to the conclusion that 
the judgment excels the simple apprehension as 
regards logical truth. It would seem, then, that 
logical truth is capable of being perfected. But 
how can this be, considering that logical truth 
consists in the exact conformity between thought 
and thing? We are thus brought face to face 
with the problem of the possibility of degrees 
in logical truth. Can one idea or judgment be 
truer than another? 

70 



Degrees of Logical Truth 71 

The question regarding the degrees in logical 
truth may be viewed in two ways; it may be 
asked whether logical truth as such, i. e., consid- 
ered as conformity between thought and thing 
has degrees, or, inquiry may be made whether 
logical truth, though not admitting degrees in 
itself, may at least be regarded as admitting them 
by reason of its connection with something which 
is subject to variations. In the latter case truth 
would be susceptible of degrees in a figurative 
sense only, or, as the scholastics express it, by 
an " extrinsic denomination/' i. e., on account of 
something extrinsic to truth as such. To illus- 
trate by an example : A souvenir left us by our 
parents is deemed worthy of esteem, not for its 
intrinsic worth, but for its extrinsic association 
with father and mother. 

63. Truth in Itself without Degrees. We 
shall begin by investigating whether the relation 
of truth viewed in itself admits of degrees. 

THESIS 8 

Logical truth, regarded in itself, that 
is, regarded as conformity between 
thought and thing, does not admit of 
degrees. 

64. Proof of Thesis. This assertion is 
proved thus : Logical truth regarded in itself 
denotes conformity, not in the sense of mere re- 



J2 Truth and Error, 

semblance, but in the sense of perfect corre- 
spondence or equality. The idea and the judg- 
ment considered as true are not merely similar 
to their respective objects, no, they are facsim- 
iles, counterparts of them. Now conformity 
in the sense of equality cannot vary and 
therefore cannot admit of more and less. Any 
change made in one of two equal things will 
result in the annihilation or destruction of their 
equality. An infinitesimal change in the lengths 
of one of two equal measures will render them 
unequal. Our imperfect senses may not per- 
ceive the inequality, yet it is there all the 
same. Hence truth, consisting as it does in 
a relation of equality, cannot admit of de- 
grees. 

The same argument may also be presented un- 
der a slightly different form in this way: 
Equality between two things, no matter where it 
is found, is always the same. Thus one mile 
is no more equal to another than one inch is to 
another. Miles and inches, in so far as they 
are equal, do not differ in the least. Now where 
there is perfect sameness, we cannot conceive of 
degrees. Hence truth regarded as such, i. e., as 
a relation of conformity between thought and 
thing, is not susceptible of more and less. 

65. In What Sense Ideas and Judgments 
Admit Degrees. Why then is one idea or 
judgment often called truer than another? Be- 



Degrees of Logical Truth 73 

cause the truth of the idea and that of the judg- 
ment are each intimately connected with some- 
thing admitting of degrees, as we shall explain in 
the next thesis. 

THESIS 9 

Ideas are rightly said to be more or 
less true by reason of their (material) 
objects, and judgments, by reason of 
their subjects. 

66. Preliminary Remarks to the Proof. In 

regard to the first part note : The " material " 
object of an idea, it will be remembered, is the 
object as it is in itself with all its attributes and 
determinations; it is so named in opposition to 
the " formal " object, by which is meant the par- 
ticular attribute or attributes that the mind con- 
ceives in the material object. It follows from 
what we have said that ideas can never be more 
or less true in regard to their formal (proper) 
objects, since to these they are always perfectly 
conformable. But the same does not hold true 
in respect to the material object, as we shall now 
proceed to point out more in detail. 

67. Proof of First Part of Thesis. Every 
body will readily admit that one idea may ex- 
press more attributes of one and the same ob- 
ject than another. Thus, I can conceive the 
same violet as a substance, as a body, as an or- 
ganism, as a flower, as a symbol of modesty. 



74 Truth and Error, 

Now of two ideas regarding the same object, 
the one expressing more attributes is rightly- 
called more conformable to the object and there- 
fore truer than the one manifesting fewer at- 
tributes, because the former is a fuller and more 
exhaustive representation of the (material) ob- 
ject than the latter. Hence it is correct to call 
ideas more or less true by reason of their (ma- 
terial) objects. 

68. Proof of Second Part of Thesis. The 
argument in regard to judgments is developed in 
a similar way. — One judgment may predicate 
more attributes of a given object than another. 
Now the judgment that assigns more attributes 
to an object is more conformable to the object; 
this makes it also truer. But the object of 
predication in a judgment is called subject and 
therefore it is on account of the subject that one 
judgment is truer than another. Thus the judg- 
ment, " Socrates is a Greek philosopher," may 
be called truer than the other, " Socrates is a 
man." In like manner when I say, " This sketch 
is a truer characterization of Christopher Co- 
lumbus than that," I mean that both characteri- 
zations are, indeed, correct descriptions of 
the discoverer of America, but that the one dis- 
closes his traits more fully than the other. To 
illustrate by analogy: We call one of two por- 
traits taken of the same person truer than the 
other, not because the first distorts the features 



Degrees of Logical Truth 75 

less than the second, but because the one brings 
out the lineaments of the face to a greater degree 
than the other. 

What we have said of affirmative judgments 
can readily be applied to such as are negative. 

69. Scholium. For the sake of greater 
completeness we would add here that the scho- 
lastics ascribe degrees to logical truth on account 
of the more or less close connection between the 
subject and the predicate. Thus according to 
them, the judgment, " The whole is greater than 
any of its parts," is truer than the other judg- 
ment, "The rose-bush is covered with dew' 5 ; 
for the nexus between " whole " and " greater 
than any of its parts " is unchangeable, whereas 
that between " rose-bush " and " covered with 
dew" is not; the former judgment can never 
become false, the latter can. — It would seem, 
however, that in English we cannot express our- 
selves thus. We may, indeed, say that the truth 
of the one judgment is altogether fixed and in- 
variable, and that of the other is not; but we 
cannot call one judgment truer than another for 
this alone that the one can be false and the other 
cannot. 

70. Sense in Which a True Judgment Can 
Become False. Attention must be drawn to 
a special difficulty much discussed by the scho- 
lastics. Is it possible for a judgment which is 
true ever to become false? Our answer is, yes 



76 TrutU and Error 

and no; no, if the matter of the judgment is deter- 
minate in every particular; and, yes, if the sub- 
ject of the judgment is left vague to some ex- 
tent, so that it can receive opposite predicates 
under varying conditions. Thus take the propo- 
sition, " My brother is sick." If the subject 
"my brother" is considered in reference to a 
definite time, say to this moment, that proposi- 
tion, if true now, will remain true forever. But 
suppose we regard the subject "my brother" 
somewhat indefinitely, not adding the circum- 
stance of time, then the sentence " my brother is 
sick," though true now, may be false to-morrow, 
because my brother may in the meantime be 
restored to health. 

71. Degrees in the (Subjective) Source of 
Truth. We have shown then in what sense 
logical truth admits degrees, as regards the ma- 
terial object of an idea and the subject of a 
judgment. It remains for us to see whether 
something similar can be said in respect to the 
intellect in which the conformity to an object 
resides. 

THESIS 10 

Logical truth admits of degrees in its 
(subjective) source, i.e., in the intel- 
lect's power to know the truth. 

72. Proof of Thesis. To realize the cor- 
rectness of this statement, note, first, the great in- 



Degrees of Logical Truth % 

equality of mental endowments amongst men; 
for the more gifted a person, the better fitted he 
is for the acquirement of truth. The man 
of genius ranks highest, the man of talent comes 
next, then the man of ordinary intellectual cali- 
ber and last of all, the man slow of understand- 
ing. Thus we observe a regular gradation of 
intellectuality from the most richly gifted to the 
most scantily endowed. Further, the native 
ability of each one for intellectual work and for 
the acquisition of truth can be greatly improved 
by cultivation: thus the mind attains to clearer 
and more distinct ideas, and becomes better 
fitted for intellectual work. For what a sharp 
edge is to the blade of a knife, clear ideas are 
to the power of the understanding. Lastly, the 
capacity of the mind for knowledge depends, to 
a great extent, on the light that pours in upon 
it from without. For just as material light en- 
ables the eye to see objects round about it, so in- 
tellectual light enables the eye of the soul to dis- 
cover hidden truths and perceive more lucidly 
those it is already acquainted with. Now the 
light coming to the soul from without consists 
in the motives or reasons for a truth. These 
motives reveal truth to the intellect as physical 
light reveals material objects to the eye. Hence 
the more numerous the motives for a truth, the 
more perfectly the intellect grasps it. This is 
the reason why a well-informed person can solve 



78 Truth and Error 

difficult questions more satisfactorily than an- 
other more gifted but less well informed. 

73. A Limitation of the Thesis. It must be 
confessed, however, that in English ideas and 
judgments are not called more or less true 
merely because the intellectual powers of the 
cognitive agent are more or less perfectly 
equipped for the attainment of truth. This can, 
of course, only be shown by an appeal to the 
common usage of the English tongue. We 
would not say, for instance, that the judgment, 
" Children should love and honor their father 
and mother," is truer when made by the teacher 
than when made by the pupil, just because the 
teacher's intellect is keener and better trained. 
When we wish to express the superiority of one 
mind over another in its mental operations, we 
employ forms of expression like the following: 
" The mind of an intellectual and well-trained 
man is more active, more accurate, quicker, 
surer in its judgments than the mind of one 
of less mental vigor and less development," or, 
" The judgment of a bright mind is more lumi- 
nous and perfect than the judgment of a less 
bright mind/' etc. 

74. Meaning of Intellectual Light. It 
might be useful here to explain more fully the 
meaning of " intellectual light." The primi- 
tive meaning of the word " light " refers, of 
course, to that form of radiant energy which 



Degrees of Logical Truth 79 

acts on the retina of the eye and renders visible 
the objects from which it comes. From the 
world of sense the term has been transferred to 
the domain of the intellect, where it has a two- 
fold meaning. First, it denotes the reasons or 
grounds which may be assigned for the truth 
of a statement; for the motives render a propo- 
sition intelligible, i. e., perceptible by the intel- 
lect, just as the light-rays make an object visible, 
i. e., perceptible by sight. Flence it is that we 
speak of putting a subject in a clearer light, of 
throwing light on a subject, of letting in light 
upon the intellect, etc. And it was in this sense 
we took the expression in the proof of the thesis. 
But " light " in reference to the mind likewise de- 
notes the intellectual faculty itself in so far as it 
is receptive of (objective) light or capable of 
seeing what is in itself intelligible. This spiritual 
light too has its counterpart in the sensible order. 
For " the sensation produced by exciting the eye " 
and " the power of perception by vision " are also 
called light, as our dictionaries attest. The term 
light is thus used in Psalm xi.io: "My heart 
is troubled, my strength has left me and the light 
of the eyes itself is not with me." It is in this 
same way that God is called " light " par excel- 
lence in the intellectual sphere, because he is 
knowledge by His very essence and the author 
and source of all created knowledge. Thus we 
read in I John 1.5: "God is light and in him 



80 Truth and Error 

there is no darkness." Similarly we speak of the 
light of glory, which is a supernatural quality 
communicated to the Blessed in heaven and en- 
abling them to see the Divine Majesty face to 
face. 

75. Critical Examination of Views of Op- 
ponents. To ward off the attacks of false phi- 
losophy on our doctrine, it will not be inopportune 
briefly to examine the views of those who con- 
sider logical truth in itself to be changeable, thus 
placing themselves in direct opposition to our 
teaching in this matter. These men tell us that 
there may be intellects elsewhere differently con- 
stituted from our own, holding as true the very 
opposite of what appears true to us ; nay, more, 
they assure us that in the process of evolution 
what is true for us to-day, may, without any 
change in the object known, become false. We 
of this generation, they say, feel sure that two 
and two are four and that lying is dishonorable; 
the men of the next generation may feel equally 
sure that two and two are five and that lying is 
most honorable. Thus Protagoras the Sophist 
asserts that one and the same thing can be true 
to " one mind and false to another, and even to 
the same mind true at one time and false at an- 
other; for both truth and falsehood are relative 
and subjective." 1 In modern times the rational- 

iStoeckl, "History of Philosophy," trans, by T. A. 
Finlay, p. 59. 



Degrees of Logical Truth 8l 

istic philosopher Ferrari says : " No absolute 
truth exists in the human mind/' 1 Thus also 
Professor James conceives truth to exist in a 
fusible, malleable condition; and he tells us that 
"we have to live to-day by what truth we can 
get to-day, and to be ready to-morrow to call it 
falsehood." 2 

John Mill quotes 3 the anonymous author of 
" Essays by a Barrister " in apparent confirmation 
of views so preposterous. This skeptical bar- 
rister asks us to " imagine a man who had never 
had any experience of straight lines through the 
medium of any sense whatever, suddenly placed 
upon a railway stretching out on a perfectly 
straight line to an indefinite distance in each di- 
rection. He would see the rails which would be 
the first straight lines he had ever seen, apparently 
meeting, or at least tending to meet at each hori- 
zon; and he would infer, in the absence of all 
other experience, that they actually did enclose 
a space when produced far enough. Experience 
alone could undeceive him." 

" Risum teneatis, amici ! " This is surely a 
childish way of proceeding. Men of this sort 
assumed to be rational would argue thus : " The 
rails seem to meet; therefore they actually do 

1 Ueberweg, " History of Philosophy," trans, by Geo. 
S. Morris, A. M. v. II, p. 514. # 

2 Professor James, Pragmatism, p. 223. 

3 Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, v. I, 
c. 6, p. 90. 



82 Truth and Error 

meet; things at a distance appear to my sight 
different from what they are near by; therefore 
they are actually different." A race of such peo- 
ple would not be rational beings at all, they would 
be an anomaly which could not exist anywhere 
except in a diseased fancy. 

We now come to the second instance in which 
the same intellectual juggler wishes to show how 
two and two might make five to people living un- 
der conditions different from our own. He says : 
" Consider this case. There is a world in which 
whenever two pairs of things are either placed 
in proximity or are contemplated together, a fifth 
thing is immediately created and brought within 
the contemplation of the mind putting two and 
two together. . . , In such a world surely two 
and two would make five." — Now what shall we 
say to this ? In the first place, the man who puts 
forth this absurdity supposes that in point of 
fact two and two are four, since he tells us that 
a fifth unit is created and brought within the con- 
templation of the mind engaged in putting two 
and two together. Hence the persons forming 
the judgment, "two and two are five," would be 
simply deceived. But is it possible for a think- 
ing faculty to be thus necessarily deluded? No, 
it is not ; for it would then be a knowing faculty 
incapable of knowing, and this involves an evi- 
dent contradiction. 



'Degrees of Logical Truth 83 

76. Evolution of Knowledge. However, 
there is a correct sense in which we may say that 
knowledge or logical truth (see n. 47) is per- 
fectible and consequently capable of evolution. 
As appears from the preceding theses, this may 
happen in two ways. First, our knowledge 
of truth can be ever broadening as regards 
the object of the mind's activity. For the 
objects of knowledge pass all bounds. Just 
as a comet traveling through the vast expanse 
of the universe, no matter how far it has gone, 
still finds endless depths of space before it, so 
likewise man's mind, when it has sounded one 
depth encounters still others and others, lying 
beyond, without ever reaching a last. And this 
will seem the less strange when we remember that 
amongst the objects of thought is God, the ab- 
solute, the incomprehensible, the infinite. 
Knowledge is, in the second place, susceptible of 
constant evolution, as regards the perfectibility 
of the human mind itself. The individual man, 
as long as he retains his intellectual powers un- 
impaired, can continue to give his mind a keener 
edge and make it fitter for the discovery of truth. 
As, moreover, every generation adds something 
of its own to the intellectual store left by those 
that went before, we can readily see how mental 
evolution can go on indefinitely, provided, of 
course, men live up to the laws which the God of 



84 Truth and Error 

nature has established for the moral growth of his 
children. Once these laws are generally set 
aside, retrogression is sure to ensue. 

77. Infinite Knowledge Incapable of Evolu- 
tion. There is one being, however, whose 
knowledge is incapable of evolution. It is that 
Being who sees everything, the present, past and 
future, the real and the possible at one glance 
and in the radiant splendor of a mind which is 
Truth Itself, the Infinite God. 



CHAPTER FOURTH 
Definition of Error or Logical Falsity 

Summary: Introduction — Falsity — Division of falsity 
— Difference in meaning of terms false- 
hood, falseness, and falsity — Negative and 
positive disagreement of thought with 
thing — Error the contrary of truth. 

78. Introduction. Hitherto we have spoken 
of logical truth. When we gave its definition at 
the beginning of our treatise, we briefly referred 
to its opposite, namely logical falsity or error 
(n. 6). We shall now develop the concept of 
error more fully. This will complete our treatise 
by showing the opposite of truth and will make 
clear a concept itself of great importance and 
fundamental in philosophy. But as error is a 
species of falsity, we must first say something 
about falsity in general and its divisions. 

79. Falsity. Falsity in general is the oppo- 
site of truth in general. Truth is conformity 
between thought and thing, and falsity non-con- 
formity between thought and thing. Since, how- 
ever, non-conformity usually designates " refusal 
or failure to conform, especially to some ecclesi- 

x 85 



86 Truth and Error 

astical law or requirement/' it will be preferable 
to avoid the term non-conformity and use in- 
stead the term " disagreement or discrepancy." 

80. Division of Falsity. Like truth, falsity 
is threefold, ontological, logical, and moral. 
Ontological truth, it will be remembered, was de- 
fined as conformity of thing with thought, log- 
ical truth, as conformity of thought with thing, 
and moral truth, as conformity of speech with 
the speaker's internal judgment. Accordingly, 
ontological falsity will be disagreement of thing 
with thought, logical falsity, disagreement of 
thought with thing, and moral falsity (or a lie) 
disagreement of speech with the speaker's inter- 
nal judgment. At present, we are concerned only 
with logical falsity, which is ordinarily called 
error. 

81. Difference in Meaning of Terms, False- 
hood, Falseness and Falsity. But before we 
enter upon its analysis, it might be well to call 
attention to the meaning of the three derivatives 
of the adjective " false/' namely, falsehood, false- 
ness, and falsity. As there is question here of 
the signification of words, we shall let the Cen- 
tury Dictionary speak for us. " The modern 
tendency," the Dictionary says, " has been de- 
cidedly in favor of separating them (sc. false- 
hood, falseness, and falsity), falsehood standing 
for the concrete thing, an intentional lie; false?-* 
ness, for the quality of being guiltily false or 



Definition of Error 87 

treacherous ; as, he is justly despised for his false- 
ness to his oath; and falsity, for the quality of 
being false without blame ; as, the falsity of rea- 
soning." Hence the most appropriate term to 
designate the disagreement between thought and 
thing is falsity. It must be acknowledged, how- 
ever, that the words falsehood and falseness are 
also sometimes used in the same meaning. 

82. Negative and Positive Disagreement of 
Thought with Thing. But to return to logical 
falsity or the disagreement of thought with thing. 
To avoid misunderstanding note that this dis- 
agreement of thought with thing may be taken in 
two ways, negatively and positively. Regarded 
negatively it consists in the intellect not repre- 
senting an object exhaustively or fully. Thus ; 
viewed it is merely, a partial negation or absence 
of truth, or, partial ignorance. This sort of dis- 
crepancy between thought and thing is common 
to all finite minds, since finite knowledge is nec- 
essarily confined within bounds. God alone is 
unlimited Truth, Truth without admixture of ig- 
norance. Bear in mind, however, that in the Eng- 
lish language, such mere want of conformity 
between thought and thing is never styled " fal- 
sity." Thus we would not term the mathemat- 
ical knowledge of a tyro in arithmetic " false " 
any more than we would call a bust of Washing- 
ton a " false " representation of the first president 
of the United States. The knowledge of a be- 



88 Truth and Error 

ginner in a science is partial knowledge, and a 
bust is a partial representation of the human fig- 
ure. 

It is not, however, negative disagreement of 
thought and thing that concerns us here ; we have 
to do with positive disagreement in which the 
mind expresses an object other than it is, or, in 
other words, in which the mind ascribes to an 
object what does not belong to it, or denies of an 
object what does belong to it. The reason then 
why this kind of disagreement between thought 
and object is qualified as positive is, because that 
which renders the intellect unconformable to its 
object is something positive, viz., a distorted ex- 
pression or a murepresentation of an object, 
and not a mere ^on-representation of something. 
To illustrate by an example — were our tyro 
in arithmetic to state that one times one equals 
two, his knowledge of the science of numbers, 
besides being limited, would likewise be false, at 
least, as far as this assertion goes. 

The difference between negative and positive 
disagreement is well elucidated by the two kinds 
of images formed in plane and convex mirrors. 
A good plane mirror gives a correct image of 
your face, although it may not reflect the rest 
of your body, but a convex mirror distorts or 
caricatures whatever part of your body it re- 
flects. 

83. Error the Contrary of Truth. We can 



Definition of Error 89 

easily see now why (logical) truth and error are 
said to be contraries. For, according to Aris- 
totle, contraries are " those things which in the 
same genus differ most. ,, But both logical truth 
and error are contained under the same genus, 
viz., intellectual act, and moreover error differs 
more from logical truth than any other intellec- 
tual act, e. g., opinion or suspicion. 



CHAPTER FIFTH 

Error in Relation to Ideas and Judgments 

ARTICLE i 

Ideas Not Subject to Error 

Summary : Question stated — Thesis — Proof — An- 
swer to a query. 

84. Question Stated. After having explained 
what logical falsity or error is, our next inquiry 
is, in what act or acts of the mind it is found. It 
is not necessary to show that our intellects are 
subject to error; sad, every-day experience at- 
tests this only too plainly. But it is not so easy 
to settle where falsity is found, whether in the 
idea or in the judgment or in both. The follow- 
ing two theses shall serve as a reply to these ques- 
tions. 

THESIS 11 

An idea taken strictly as such cannot 
be false. 

Note that in the thesis we speak of ideas strictly 
so called, i. e., of ideas regarded purely as men- 

90 



Ideas not Subject to Error 91 

tal representations or expressions of objects. 
For, as we shall explain more fully further on 
(n. 91), ideas are sometimes taken in a wider 
sense for representations involving a relation to 
judgments. 

85. Proof of Thesis. The thesis is proved 
thus : Every idea is, of its very nature, an image, 
as appears from the definition of an idea properly 
so called. Now an image which is not conformed 
to some object, is no image at all; to style it an 
image, involves a contradiction. Hence every 
idea is necessarily conformed to some object and 
consequently necessarily true. An idea to be 
true need not, however, resemble this or that 
definite object ; it is sufficient for it to be in accord 
with the object which it actually represents, no 
matter whether that object is existent or merely 
possible. Thus the idea of a mountain of gold 
is a true idea; for it is conformable to some 
reality, which, if not actually existing is, at least, 
possible. 

86. A Query. But some one may say per- 
haps, how do you know that the definition of an 
idea as given by us is correct and not arbitrarily 
formed? Are there not many philosophers who 
deny that ide ,s are representations of things and 
who look upon them as mere subjective modifica- 
tions of the thinking agent? 

There are philosophers, we admit, who regard 
ideas in this light, but through a very excess of 



92 Truth and Error 

unreasonableness. For if ideas are mere sub- 
jective forms of the mind and do not express 
things, all knowledge of things is thereby ren- 
dered impossible ; hence skepticism, and that, too, 
of the most sweeping universality would be our 
inevitable lot. — The radical reason why ideas 
represent things, is bound up with the very con- 
stitution of our minds. For, as is evident to 
everybody, the mind is a knowing faculty. Now 
it would not be a knowing faculty, if ideas did 
not represent things, since knowledge consists in 
the mind rendering things present to itself by 
means of ideas. 

ARTICLE 2 

Judgments Subject to Error 

Summary: Relation of judgment to error — ■ Thesis — 
Proof — Solution of a difficulty — Answer 
to a query — In what sense ideas may be 
called false — Discussion of two difficulties 
against the necessary truth of ideas — 
Scholium. 

87. Relation of Judgment to Error. Since 

ideas then cannot be false, where is falsity found ? 
Our next thesis will answer this query. 

THESIS 12 
Judgments can be false. 

88. Proof. This thesis follows as a corol- 
lary from the preceding one (n. 84). For it is 



Ideas not Subject to Error 93 

certain that some one of our mental operations 
is subject to error; how could we otherwise ac- 
count for the many mistakes we make? Now 
this operation of the mind is not the simple ap- 
prehension, as just shown. Therefore it must be 
the judgment either immediate or mediate. 

This argument by exclusion proves the fact 
that the judgment is liable to error. It will be 
useful to add two short proofs which take cog- 
nizance of the manner in which the intellect 
makes mistakes. The first is as follows: 

Experience tells us that when we err we re- 
gard as identical things which are not identical, 
or consider as non-identical things which are 
identical. Now it is in the judgment that we 
hold objects to be identical or otherwise. Hence 
we infer that judgments can be erroneous. 

The second argument, a variation of the pre- 
ceding, is based on the nature of error. 

To err is to affirm of an object what does not 
belong to it, or to deny of an object what does 
belong to it. The correctness of this follows 
from the very idea of error as expressed in its 
definition. Now since affirmation and negation 
are peculiar to the judgment, we are again led 
to the conclusion that error can be found in the 
judgment. 

The last two arguments likewise serve as a 
confirmation of the previous thesis that ideas 
cannot be false. 



94 Truth and Error 

89. Solution of a Difficulty. But Here a 
difficulty suggests itself. How is it possible for 
the intellect to err at all? Has it not truth for 
its end and does it not consequently seek truth 
of its very nature? How then can it err, since 
to do so would be opposed to its natural tend- 
ency? 

We reply, it is unquestionable that truth is the 
goal of the mind. From this, however, it merely 
follows that when the intellect accepts anything 
that is false, it does so because of the apparent 
truth in it. Just as evil must present itself under 
the guise of good before the will can choose it, 
so error has to put on the garb of truth before 
the intellect can assent to it. The ancients could 
never have believed that the earth was flat unless 
it had seemed true to them. No one nowadays 
could adhere to such a persuasion ; for it no longer 
has even the semblance of truth. 

90. Answer to a Query. The explanation 
just given likewise supplies the answer to a ques- 
tion often asked in this connection. Does the 
mind perceive its own lack of conformity to a 
thing in a false judgment as it perceives its own 
conformity to an object in a true judgment? 

We say, it does not, at least not clearly; for 
if it clearly apprehended its own deviation from 
truth, it would thereby become aware of its own 
mistake and thus cease to be mistaken. What 



Ideas not Subject to Error 95 

the mind does cognize in a false statement, is its 
apparent or seeming agreement with reality. 

91. In What Sense Ideas May Be Called 
False. We have now finished the discussion 
of the theses that ideas cannot, and judgments 
can be false. But before we proceed further, we 
must dispose of an objection to our teaching. 
We often hear people speak of false or erroneous 
ideas. How can such modes of speech be recon- 
ciled with the doctrine just set forth? 

This exception taken to' our position can, how- 
ever, be easily shown to be groundless. For al- 
though ideas are often designated as false, yet 
they are never so designated when they are re- 
garded strictly as ideas, but only when they are 
considered relatively to judgments, or when 
" idea " is identical in signification with " judg- 
ment." 

Now ideas viewed relatively to judgments are 
termed false in two ways ; first, because they can 
occasion false judgments. It is plain that in this 
case the adjective " false " is employed not prop- 
erly but analogously. For it signifies, not what 
the definition of falsity implies, but " capable of 
occasioning a false judgment/' Thus if I con- 
ceive " gold " merely as a bright, yellow metal 
or represent " diamond " to myself as a trans- 
parent substance sparkling in the sun, I may 
be said to have a false idea of " gold " and of 






96 Truth and Error 

" diamond," since these two ideas may easily lead 
me to judge that a showy brass watch-chain is 
made of gold or that a piece of cut glass worn 
in a necklace is a diamond. 

In the second place, ideas viewed relatively to 
judgments are called false because they are the 
result of false judgments and can again be re- 
solved into false judgments. For illustration 
take the three expressions, " spontaneous genera- 
tion," " missing link," and " thinking matter." 
Each of these three phrases (or compound ideas) 
implies a previous false judgment. For the first 
supposes erroneously that living beings can be 
generated from non-living matter; the second is 
based on the mistaken opinion that the human 
race had some simian form for its immediate 
ancestral stock; and the third rests on the false 
assumption that matter is capable of thinking. 

Ideas are likewise called false, because by an 
abuse of language idea sometimes signifies the 
same as judgment. Thus we speak of false ideas 
of liberty, social order, property, government, be- 
cause of the false judgments formed of these 
subjects. Here is what Webster has to say on 
this point : " There is scarcely any word which 
is subjected to such abusive treatment, as the 
word idea, in the general way in which it is em- 
ployed, as it is used variously to signify almost 
any act, state, or content of thought." 

When ideas are false in either of the two ways 



Ideas not Subject to Error 97 

just explained, they are termed false "per ac- 
cidens " by the scholastics. 

92. Discussion of Two Difficulties against 
the Necessary Truth of Ideas. t We shall now 
add two difficulties against the necessary truth 
of ideas. We deferred their discussion to this 
place, because the solution of these difficulties 
cannot be satisfactorily understood without some 
reference to the last thesis on error. 

93. First Difficulty. Let us begin by di- 
recting attention to an apparent inconsistency be- 
tween the last two theses. If ideas are neces- 
sarily true, it might be asked, how can there be 
false judgments? For what is a judgment but 
the union or separation of two ideas by means of 
affirmation or negation ? 

To understand the answer to this objection, 
note first, that when a judgment is said to be the 
union (or separation) of two ideas, there is ques- 
tion, not of subjective, but of objective ideas, i. e., 
of the objects expressed by the subjective ideas. 
Now it may easily happen that, though the sub- 
jective ideas rightly represent their respective 
objects, the mind may nevertheless combine two 
objects which are not identical. For the subjec- 
tive ideas, notwithstanding their being true, may 
be only partial, and hence confused, vague, or 
indistinct expressions of their objects. In such 
a case, it is quite possible for the intellect to per- 
ceive an apparent identity where in reality there 



98 Tjuth and Error 

is no identity. This shows that we can have false 
judgments without false ideas properly so called. 
It must, however, be held that false judgments in- 
variably presuppose confused ideas, in other 
words, false ideas in an improper sense of the 
term. For ideas which are in every way clear 
and distinct conceptions of their objects cannot 
result in erroneous judgments, because, as we 
shall explain at length further on (n. 96), the in- 
tellect can never be mistaken except when unduly 
influenced by the will, and it cannot be thus in- 
fluenced when the identity between the subject 
and the predicate is altogether evident as it would 
be, if the ideas involved in a judgment expressed 
their objects with perfect definition and dis- 
tinctness. Take an example: Suppose I say, 
" Francis wishes me well," because he always 
seems pleased when I meet him — this judgment 
may be false by reason of the indistinct concep- 
tion I have of Francis, the subject of the prop- 
osition. But if Francis, besides always showing 
me a beaming countenance, likewise confers 
benefits upon me and puts himself to trouble for 
my sake without any prospect of an adequate 
return, then my idea of Francis possesses such 
clearness as to preclude the possibility of a mis- 
take in my judgment, " Francis wishes me well." 
The foregoing difficulty, then, merely shows 
that our ideas of things are often confused, but 



Ideas not Subject to Error 99 

not that they are ever false in the full rigor of 
the word. 

94. Second Difficulty. The existence of 
genuinely false ideas, however, seems to follow 
from other considerations. In fact, the very na- 
ture of an idea apparently implies it; for are 
ideas not images of things? Now everybody 
knows that images may be unlike the objects 
which they represent. Hence it looks very much 
as if the argument which we brought forward for 
the necessary truth of ideas, derived as it is from 
the nature of an image, proves the very oppo- 
site. 

This objection rests on a misapprehension. It 
is undoubtedly correct that images are often un- 
like the definite, determined objects to which 
they are attributed: but they are never different 
from the objects which they actually represent 
or — to use a scholastic term — they are never at 
variance with their " formal objects." These 
they always express to the smallest particulars. 
Thus when watching a wheel moving very rap- 
idly, I may perhaps form the idea of a " wheel 
at rest." This idea, as an idea, is true, since it 
is, in reality, conformable to a wheel at rest. The 
fact that it does not represent the thing before 
me as it is in itself, matters not; because an idea 
as such has no immediate relation to anything 
except what it actually presents to the intellect; 



ioo Truth and Error 

it is only through the judgment that an idea is 
referred to this or that definite thing, in our case, 
to the swiftly turning wheel as it exists in ex- 
ternal nature. 

But, some one perhaps objects, your answer 
is not satisfactory. For it supposes that there is 
always at least a possible object corresponding to 
an idea. Such, however, does not seem to be the 
case. Thus no objects of any sort answer to the 
ideas of " square circle," " finite God," " a think- 
ing bush," and similar absurdities. Hence these 
ideas are strictly false because ideas are strictly 
false when they represent no objects. 

We answer in general that there can be no one 
idea of an absurdity as such. For absurdities 
are made up of incompatible ideas, and it is im- 
possible to combine two incompatible ideas into 
one idea for the very reason that they are in- 
compatible. 

But, perhaps, you take exception to our reply. 
For if we have no idea, say, of a square circle, 
how can we speak of it and make it the subject 
of a proposition? 

We can meet this evasion of our solution in 
two ways. Our first response is:- When we 
pronounce the judgment, e. g., " A square cir- 
cle is an impossibility," we really conceive . two 
separate ideas, viz., square and circle; and of 
these two ideas regarded relatively, we affirm 
that they are incompatible or mutually destruc- 



Ideas not Subject to Error 101 

tive. Hence the above judgment might also be 
expressed thus : " The idea of square cannot 
possibly be combined into one with the idea of 
circle," or, " The identification of square and 
circle is an impossibility." In this view of the 
case then, since irreconcilable ideas do not 
coalesce into one idea, we cannot be said to have 
an idea of an absurdity. 

Sometimes, however — and this is the second 
way of encountering the attempt to explain away 
the answer to the last difficulty — the intellect 
does combine two contradictory ideas into one 
idea; but whenever this happens, it drops the 
note or notes which render them incompatible; 
consequently, at least one of the ideas involved 
in such absurd combinations is an inadequate or 
vague representation of its object. It is in this 
way that some people have succeeded in form- 
ing the idea of " bee endowed with intelligence." 
They apprehended " bee," let us say, as " an ani- 
mal capable of producing regular structures," 
omitting the attributes which make " bee " and 
" intelligent " incompatible. Thus it became 
possible for them to form the judgment, " bees 
are endowed with intelligence " and then to unite 
the subject and predicate of the judgment into 
the compound idea, " bees endowed with intelli- 
gence." Had they conceived " bee " rightly as 
" an animal capable indeed of building regular 
structures, but essentially incapable of knowing 



102 Truth and Error 

how or why it fashions those structures/' they 
would not have fallen into the mistake. 

It will be remembered that ideas such as " bee 
endowed with intelligence/' are called by the 
scholastics false " per aceidens," that is, false as 
the result of a false judgment. (See n. 91.) 

95. A Scholium. Having thus settled in 
what intellectual act error is found, we shall next 
say something about another question closely 
connected with the previous discussion and analo- 
gous to a question minutely sifted in the part of 
the treatise relating to " truth/' namely the ques- 
tion of degrees in error. Can one judgment be 
falser or more erroneous than another? We 
stated before that truth as such, consisting as it 
does in a relation of equality between thought 
and thing, does not admit of degrees. Just the 
opposite holds true of error, because it is con- 
stituted by a relation of inequality between 
thought and thing, and inequality is, of its very 
nature, variable. 

The same may also be shown in another way. 
Falsity is regarded as a positive departure from 
truth for the reason that it is not merely a non- 
representation, but a distorted expression of 
something. Now, as positive departure from 
truth may be more or less considerable, it follows 
that one statement may be more or less erroneous 
than another. Thus the judgment, " The world 
is not created nor distinct from the Deity," is 



Ideas not Subject to Error 103 

further removed from the truth and hence falser 
than this other, " The world is not created indeed, 
but is distinct from the Deity." 

Note, however, that if we prescind from the 
positive element in falsity and view it merely 
as a lack of mental conformity to the object of 
thought or as contrariety to truth, then it evi- 
dently does not admit of variations. 

All other inquiries regarding this phase of 
our subject are to be decided on lines similar 
to those followed in our investigations of the de- 
grees of truth. But as a lengthier discussion of 
this point is of lesser importance, we shall rest 
satisfied with having drawn attention to this 
problem and pointed out in general in what man- 
ner it can be solved. 



CHAPTER SIXTH 
The Will in Relation to Error 

Summary: Error due to will — Thesis — Preliminary 
remarks — Elucidation of thesis — Scho- 
lium — How the will induces the intellect 
into error — Influence on the will when 
the intellect errs — Answer to an objec- 
tion. 

96. Error Due to Will. Knowing now 
that the judgment only can err, we shall examine 
next from what source error comes or how it 
is possible for error to insinuate itself into the 
mind. This will be the burden of our next two 
theses. 

THESIS 13 

The intellect cannot err of itself, i.e., 
when left to its own resources; but it 
is capable of erring under the impulse 
of the will, in matters not evident. 

The thesis may also be stated in other words 
thus: The human mind is essentially infallible 
in the sense that error cannot accrue to it from 
within, but it is essentially fallible in the sense 

104 



The Will in Relation to Error 105 

that error can, under certain conditions, enter 
into it from without. This is what the scholas- 
tics understand by saying that the human in- 
tellect is infallible "per se," but fallible "per 
accidens." 

97. Preliminary Remarks. Lest, however, 
our meaning be mistaken we wish to notice first 
that the statement just made is incapable of de- 
monstration, because that statement can plainly 
not be demonstrated, the truth of which must be 
taken for granted before I am capable of demon- 
strating anything. Now the assertion that the 
mind does not err of itself is of this sort. For 
unless I assume the truth of this assertion, how 
can I know that I will not err in my demonstra- 
tion? 

But it does not follow from this that the in- 
errancy of the mind when not interfered with 
from without, is assumed blindly; for it is self- 
evident and hence dispenses with all proof. This 
inerrancy no more stands in need of proof to be 
known with certainty than the sun requires the 
light of a candle to be seen with distinctness. 
The considerations we are about to offer are 
merely intended to make the evidence of the 
truth in question shine out more clearly and scat- 
ter whatever haze might prevent its free play 
upon the mind. 

98. Elucidation of First Part of Thesis. 
The first part of the thesis (viz., that the mind 



io6 Truth and Error 

cannot err when left to itself) can be elucidated 
thus : 

If the mind could err of itself, it would then 
-be capable, by its very nature, without any out- 
side interference, of expressing things within 
itself other than they are. Now a faculty which 
can do this, is not a knowing faculty since to 
know is to express things as they are. Hence 
the supposition that the mind can err of itself, 
deprives it of its character as a knowing fac- 
ulty. Nor does it avail to say that the intellect 
may remain a knowing faculty even though it 
can go astray of itself in some matters, pro- 
vided it cannot do so in all. For if the 
cognitive faculty when left entirely to its own 
resources can fall short sometimes, how can I 
tell that any particular judgment is not one of 
the deplorable cases in which the mind is in- 
trinsically fallible? Would not every judgment 
proceed from the same tainted source? The as- 
sumption, then, that the intellect when unham- 
pered from without can swerve from the truth, 
destroys all certainty and lands us in universal 
skepticism. It has consequently the mark of 
absurdity plainly stamped upon it. 

Nor have any of those pretending to deny the 
infallibility of the intellect in the sense explained 
ever been truly convinced of their denial since 
they cannot so much as deny this infallibility 
without in the same breath implicitly affirming 



The Will in Relation to Error 107 

it and thus plainly contradicting themselves. 
For how can they know that their denial is true 
— as they tell us they know — unless they sup- 
pose their minds to be essentially infallible when 
making this denial? 

99. Elucidation of Second Part of Thesis. 
We now come to the second part of the thesis 
in which we assert that the intellect can err, un- 
der the impulse of the will, in matters not evi- 
dent. Note we say, in matters not evident. 
This implies that in matters which are evident 
the intellect cannot wander from the truth. 
For if it could, it would then be incapable of ar- 
riving at truth, even when the object is pre- 
sented to it under the most favorable circum- 
stances, namely when illumined by evidence; 
and to suppose this, is to suppose what is against 
the very nature of the mind as a cognitive fac- 
ulty. Again (objective) evidence is the last cri- 
terion of truth; now this must be altogether in- 
compatible with error. For otherwise we must 
despair of ever arriving at certainty. 

The intellect then can never be deceived in 
matters presented to it as evident; hence since, 
in point of fact, it does often err, this can be 
only when evidence is lacking. Nor need we be 
surprised at the mind's liability to go astray un- 
der such circumstances. For it is a finite and 
hence a limited faculty; now a limited faculty 
may fall short of perfection if all the conditions 



108 Truth and Error 

for the due exercise of its activity do not ob- 
tain; consequently, since evidence is one of the 
conditions for the right use of the understand- 
ing, we need not wonder at error creeping into 
the mind when the truth is not evident. In a 
similar manner, the sense of sight is exposed to 
many illusions if the requisites for proper vision 
are not at hand. 

We have thus shown that though the intel- 
lect cannot be deluded in matters which are evi- 
dent, it may be deluded where evidence is not 
forthcoming. It still remains to prove that er- 
ror makes its way into the intellect through the 
will. Here are a few reflections to assist us in 
making this matter clear. 

Since the mind, unlike the will, is not free, 
it cannot, of course, determine itself to mental 
assent or dissent, but must be determined. Now 
this determination cannot proceed from any 
other source than either from the object of 
thought or from the will, since there is nothing 
else not reducible to these two that can influence 
the intellect. But it cannot arise from the ob- 
ject of thought. For this is offered to the mind 
either with or without evidence. If the former 
is the case, the judgment in regard to that ob- 
ject is necessarily true since, as we pointed out 
above, evidence cannot stand with error. But 
if the latter happens, namely if the object placed 
before the intellect is devoid of evidence, no 



The Will in Relation to Error 109 

judgment can follow at all, because when suf- 
ficient evidence is not available the mind does 
not truly see what is presented to view, and con- 
sequently, being as it is a knowing or " seeing " 
faculty, cannot be moved to yield assent. It 
follows then that the object cannot cause the in- 
tellect to commit itself to a false judgment; er- 
ror must therefore be traceable to the will. 

100. Scholium. It is plain that the will can 
never " elicit " i. e., form a judgment, since the 
judgment is an intellectual act and the will can 
put forth only volitional acts. What the will 
can do, is to urge the mind to make a given judg- 
ment. There is nothing in this that exceeds 
the power of the will as can be readily seen from 
parallel instances. Thus, the will cannot, indeed, 
nod or speak, but it can in some subtle way so 
exert its dominion over the muscles of the neck 
and the organs of the voice as to make the head 
bend forward and the tongue give utterance to 
words. 

101. How the Will Induces the Intellect 
into Error. However, in order that the will 
may induce the mind to embrace error it is nec- 
essary, on the one hand, that the false should 
have the appearance of truth — since the intel- 
lect can never accept as true a statement which 
it evidently recognizes to be false — and on the 
other, that there should be inducements for the 
will to prefer error to truth. It will be conven- 



no Truth and Error 

ient to set down first some of the mental condi- 
tions which tend to clothe the false in the garb 
of truth and make it possible for the will to ex- 
ert an undue influence on the mind. 

The chief offenders in this matter are confused 
ideas, that is, partial representations which do 
not express enough attributes of things to enable 
us to discern one thing from another. For thus 
we come to ascribe to one object what we ob- 
serve in another with which it agrees in some 
particulars but from which it differs in others. 
What holds true of confused ideas applies, 
of course, to confused judgments and reasonings 
as well. As we gave several examples illustra- 
tive of this point in explaining the difficulties 
against the previous thesis (n. n. 91, 93), there 
is no need of adding any others. 

Anything then that promotes confusion of 
thought, likewise predisposes the mind to error; 
and many, indeed, are the factors calculated to 
obscure our ideas. To mention a few of them: 

In every language there are words of ambigu- 
ous meaning. The same expression often sig- 
nifies several things alike in some respects, but 
unlike in others. Hence the mind is prone 
wrongly to substitute one thing for another. 
Thus a father may think that he has complied 
with his duty of educating his sons if he sends 
them to an institution where their intellectual 
powers only are developed, because " training 



The Will in Relation to Error in 

of the head " is one of the meanings which some 
people give the much abused word " education." 

Vagueness of ideas is further fostered by the 
weakness and treachery of our memories. You 
forget an occurrence in part and, in consequence, 
are liable to take it for another. Perhaps you 
deem some past action of yours blameworthy 
because a circumstance rendering it lawful has 
escaped your mind. 

The imagination is likewise frequently charge- 
able with our confusion of thought. Restless 
and illusive as it often is, whilst I am thinking 
of one thing it slips another into its place bearing 
some resemblance to the former. In this man- 
ner the intellect, by reason of its (extrinsic) de- 
pendence on the fancy, is apt to jumble ideas 
together and then wander from the truth. Is 
it not thus that the builders of castles in the air 
are deluded and that many a one idles away his 
time in a fool's paradise, only to be driven from 
it rudely by the stern realities of life? 

" Hence the fool's paradise, the statesman's scheme, 
The air-built castle and the golden dream." 1 

Confusion of thought then is the fundamental 
disposition on the part of the intellect for the 
formation of mistaken judgments. But judg- 
ments thus formed are very apt to become the 
ground-work of further errors. In this way, 

1 Pope, Dunciad, III, 9. 



H2 Truth and Error 

it has come to pass that ingenious speculators 
have erected entire philosophical systems, de- 
fective " from turret to foundation stone/' be- 
cause they built upon wrong principles. These 
philosophers have been likened to men with dis- 
eased eye-sight. For as diseased eye-sight dis- 
torts everything presented to it, so a mind im- 
bued with erroneous principles twists and 
perverts every truth seen in the light of these 
principles. 

There is especially one class of errors which, 
when they have once taken hold of the mind, it 
is well-nigh impossible to uproot, namely prej- 
udices. By these are usually meant deep- 
seated, erroneous opinions which are used as 
starting points for judging about other matters. 
These prejudices are manifold, racial, national, 
sectional, political, religious, etc. Of these the 
most deeply rooted are those which have been 
implanted in our youth. 

Another predisposing cause to error on the 
part of the intellect and a great ally to confused 
ideas is a want of proper attention and reflection 
manifesting itself in absent-mindedness and men- 
tal distractions. Many confused ideas would 
disappear were the mind but careful to attend 
to them and examine into them closely. But it 
only too often performs this task in a very de- 
ficient and perfunctory manner. The reasons 
for such lack of mental diligence and effort are 



The Will in Relation to Error 113 

various. Often it is due to the attractions of 
sense completely engrossing the whole man, or 
to preoccupations with other matters than the 
one under consideration. Frequently absent- 
mindedness and distractions are traceable to 
moral causes : some one is worried, excited, em- 
barrassed, or under the influence of some other 
strong emotion. In consequence his mind 
wanders; he cannot concentrate his thoughts on 
the question he is engaged upon. Sometimes, 
too, the intellect cannot reflect on its ideas suf- 
ficiently by reason of the nature of the subject 
to be investigated. Perhaps the subject is very 
complicated ; it branches out into numerous parts 
and subdivisions; lengthy and difficult reason- 
ings are required to arrive at a final conclusion. 
The attention is scattered among a multiplicity 
of details and hence cannot be centered on any 
one point in particular ; thus the intellect becomes 
bewildered, and who does not know how con- 
ducive such a state of mind is to confusion of 
thought ? 

102. Influence on the Will when the 
Intellect Errs. These are a few of the mental 
conditions which give an appearance of truth 
to what is really false. We shall next search 
out some of the inducements urging the will 
to prefer error to truth. These inducements 
are of two kinds, the one making the will desirous 
to have a certain judgment true, and the other 



114 Truth and Error 

making it overeager to have the intellect arrive 
at a conclusion speedily. 

As regards the first class of these inducements 
there may be as many as there are human in- 
terests. Thus, for example, our wills are often 
led to desire that something should be true, be- 
cause it is useful to us, or because it flatters our 
passions, as our pride, our greed, our love of 
power, or because it promotes the welfare of 
others, as of our country, friends, benefactors, 
etc., etc. In such cases, our wills frequently 
strive to make what is really evil and wrong ap- 
pear good and right by urging on our intellects 
to turn to reasons in favor of what we want, 
and away from reasons against it. By skilful 
maneuvering of this kind, the volitional faculty 
at times succeeds in giving to the false a sem- 
blance of truth and finally wresting assent to 
error from the deluded intellect. Thus an avari- 
cious man is very likely to chance upon reasons 
why his ill-gotten gains have been acquired justly 
and need not be restored to the rightful owner; 
for he wants it to be so. A conceited person will 
give ready credence to the most fulsome flat- 
teries, because he wishes these commendations 
to be true. 

And now a word about the second kind of in- 
ducements which dispose the will to lead the in- 
tellect into hasty conclusions. 

One of the most ordinary of these induce- 



The Will in Relation to Error, 115 

ments is the necessity we are sometimes under 
of acting on the spur of the moment or of giving 
advice without being allowed time to deliberate. 
Many a luckless student has failed to satisfy 
his examiners, because he lacked leisure to con- 
sider. Frequently those incentives to the will 
for misleading the mind are traceable to a per- 
son's overconfidence in his powers and to a con- 
sequent disdain to reflect. Often they originate 
in a dread of being regarded mentally sluggish, 
or in an unwillingness to exert one's brain. This 
latter is one of the reasons why so many prefer 
to take their opinions ready-made from others 
in whose wake they blindly follow. 

We have thus established that error is always, 
in last resort, due to the pressure of the will 
brought to bear upon the intellect. 

103. Answer to an Objection. But, some 
one here interposes, are there not mistakes with 
which the will has nothing at all to do? When 
a clerk blunders in adding up a column of figures, 
or a copyist misspells a syllable with the spelling 
of which he is perfectly familiar, or a reader 
mispronounces a well-known word — surely the 
will of any one thus erring cannot be held re- 
sponsible for the mistake; in fact, these per- 
sons, it would appear, willed the very contrary 
of what they did. 

To solve this difficulty observe that these mis- 
takes are not mistakes of the mind so much as 



n6 Truth and Error 

tricks of the fancy and slips of the pen and 
tongue. The fancy, the hand, and the tongue 
are not always completely under our control. 
The errors just referred to should rather be 
called " mechanical " errors, " mechanical " here 
meaning "made or done as if by a machine." 
But even regarded in this way, they are often 
due to a want of sufficient attention and effort, 
as is plainly evidenced by the severe reproofs at 
times administered to those failing to give satis- 
faction in the performance of their work. 
However, it is not with this sort of errors that 
we are concerned here, but with purely intel- 
lectual errors. These, we hold, always have 
their origin in the will. Hence should the ac- 
countant assert positively and unconditionally 
that his calculations are correct, and the coypist, 
that no spelling mistake has slipped into his 
pages, and the speaker, that every word of his 
speech was pronounced according to approved 
fashion, they must, if mistaken, be charged with 
hastiness in their judgments and going beyond 
what the evidence at their disposal warrants. 
But, as a rule, men are not thus absolute in their 
statements. Most men know their limitations 
and the great difficulty there is of always reach- 
ing the highest degree of excellence. Hence 
they will pronounce upon the faultlessness of 
their work only conditionally or with some qual- 



The Will in Relation to Error 117 

ification; in which case they do not err. Thus 
the accountant, if he be wise, will say : " My 
calculations are correct to the best of my knowl- 
edge/' and this is true. 



CHAPTER SEVENTH 
Error, in What Respect Necessary 

Summary: Question stated — Thesis — Physical and 
moral necessity of error — Formal and ma- 
terial error — Proofs of thesis — Two scho- 
lia — Summing up — Conclusion. 

104. Question Stated. We now come to 
another point closely connected with what pre- 
cedes. It regards the question to what extent 
error is necessary. The following thesis shall 
embody what is to be held on this matter. 

THESIS 14 

Error, though it is never physically 
necessary (inevitable), may be so 
morally. 

105. Physical and Moral Necessity of Er- 
ror. Before we enter upon the proof of this 
statement, a few preliminary remarks are needed 
to clear the way. And first we must explain 
what is meant by physical and moral necessity 
of error, as the right understanding of the thesis 
hinges on a correct conception of these two no- 
tions. 

118 



Error, in What Respect Necessary 119 

We are physically necessitated to error if our 
intellects do not possess the natural or physical 
power to keep clear of error. Suppose we 
could no more avoid error than we can stave off 
death, error would be a physical necessity to 
us. We are morally necessitated to error if the 
obstacles in the way of full truth are so great 
that we cannot surmount them save by efforts 
almost passing human strength. The qualifying 
word " moral " is employed because the natural 
inclinations, tendencies, and habits of man, which 
form the main obstacles to the avoidance of er- 
ror are called "mores" (manners, habits) in 
Latin. By way of illustration take a man who 
is intensely national. Ordinarily it is a hopeless 
task to convince such a one of certain failings 
of his nation. It is morally impossible for him 
to rid himself of his mistaken notions. 

106. Formal and Material Error. There is 
still another important division of error to be 
noted here, although not so generally known as 
the one just given, namely the division of error 
into " formal " and " material " error. 

Formal error is the firm adherence of the mind 
to what is false. This is true, genuine 
error, or error properly so called. Material 
error is probable assent to a false statement for 
satisfactory reasons, or, if you will, it is a well- 
founded, prudent opinion, which, however, 
chances to be false. Hence it differs greatly 



120 Truth and Error 

from formal or true error, since in it we do not 
adhere to a false assertion as certain, but only as 
probable and well-founded. Error of this kind 
regards the matter of a statement rather than the 
assent itself, and it is on this account that it is 
named material (objective) error. It is quali- 
fied or conditioned error, whilst formal error is 
unqualified or unconditioned error. 

107. Proof of First Part of Thesis. Our 
argument for the first part of the thesis, viz., that 
error is never physically necessary, runs thus : 

If error were ever physically necessary to the 
mind, this necessity would proceed either from 
the nature of the intellectual faculty or from 
the object known or from the will. For, these 
are the only three causes which, in the order of 
nature, can influence cognition. Now intellec- 
tual compulsion to error, if such there be, can 
plainly not have its origin in the nature of the 
knowing faculty, since (as shown before n. 96) 
the mind of itself never strays from the truth. 
Nor can the object necessitate the intellect to 
yield assent. For the object cannot constrain 
a faculty to act in response unless it be duly 
applied to that faculty. Thus an object, though 
colored, is incapable of making itself seen by 
the eye unless it is impressed on the organ of 
sight by the action of light. Now an object is 
applied to the intellect through evidence because 
it is through this light and through this light alone 



Error, in What Respect Necessary 121 

that a thing can truly manifest itself to the cog- 
nitive faculty. But evidence is not compatible 
with error. Hence, an object when presenting 
itself as evident, although it does wrest assent 
from the mind, never wrests any other assent 
from it than assent to truth. 

There is finally the will. Is it ever coerced 
to offer violence to the mind by so befogging 
and pressing upon it as to drive it into error? 
No, it never is. For the will is necessitated to 
action only by good without any admixture of 
evil. Now error is far from being such a good ; 
it is only an apparent good, a good marred by 
evil. Whence it follows that error is never a 
physical necessity to us. If we err, we err of 
our own free choice. 

108. Proof of Second Part of Thesis. But, 
as stated in the second part of our thesis, error 
is sometimes morally necessary, in other words, 
the hindrances to be overcome in keeping aloof 
from error are often so many and so great that 
most men are sure not to surmount them. 

And first, there is nothing incongruous in the 
possibility of a moral necessity for error. 
For as long as error, though avoidable only with 
the greatest difficulty, is not foisted upon the 
mind with absolute necessity, it is due to the 
free action of the will, and that such can be the 
case we have maintained all along. 

The fact that error is often morally inevitable 



122 Truth and Error 

is brought home to us by every-day experience. 
Have we not all clung to a false opinion with 
such tenacity that, had not circumstances changed 
and light poured in from unexpected quarters 
we should never have been undeceived? And 
have we not at times, when our strong belief in 
some pet theory was assailed as untenable, said : 
" No one shall ever convince me that I am 
wrong?" When afterwards brought face to 
face with incontestable proofs upsetting our per- 
suasion, we perhaps exclaimed : " Who could 
ever have thought it? I could never have be- 
lieved it " ; all which goes to show that until 
the obstacles in the way of seeing the truth had 
been removed, it was practically impossible for 
us to rid ourselves of our erroneous opinions. 

What we have noticed in our own mental life, 
we find corroborated by observing the conduct 
of others. We behold men so wedded to false 
religious beliefs or so attached to doubtful po- 
litical principles that a change of view in their 
case would seem nothing short of a miracle. We 
say of such persons, " They are in good faith, 
but mistaken," and we often deem it a matter of 
prudence not to meddle with them, but to let them 
alone ; for arguing with them, only renders them 
more obstinate. How often has it not happened 
in times past that nations have gone to war and 
sacrificed thousands of lives in defense of false 
principles and unfounded claims which they, in 



Error, in What Respect Necessary 123 

all honesty, deemed as beyond all dispute? 
Those errors of the ancients regarding the mo- 
tion of the sun, the flatness of the earth, and 
the non-existence of antipodes were, undoubt- 
edly, in most cases morally insuperable. 

To account for this fixedness in error on the 
part of the mind, we need only recall the many 
causes of false judgments enumerated before. 
The intellect finds itself at times hedged about by 
so many fallacious arguments and the will so 
strongly allured by some apparent good or so 
fiercely repelled by some dreaded evil that it 
would require an almost superhuman effort for 
truth to come into its own. We say an almost 
superhuman effort. For occasionally, though 
very rarely, some one succeeds in rolling back 
the thick cloud of error. Such exceptions to the 
rule go to show that there is no physical, but 
only a moral impossibility, to shake off error. 

109. Two Scholia. To complete our doc- 
trine on the avoidableness of error and to ward 
off prospective difficulties, we shall make a few 
observations. 

We are sometimes liable to imagine that there 
is " formal " or real error where there is only 
" material " error. For what we think another 
holds for altogether certain, he adheres to 
merely as a well-founded opinion, for which, as 
a matter of fact, he has good reasons. In such 
a case the person is not really mistaken, though 



124 Truth and Error 

the view he advocates is false, because he puts 
it forward merely as possessed of solid proba- 
bility, and this we suppose it to possess. Take 
an instance. A merchant has a clerk in his em- 
ploy who for a great number of years has al- 
ways proved himself loyal and faithful to his 
firm. He confides in his long-tried assistant and 
would resent any attack on the latter's honesty. 
Still all along he is aware of the possibility of 
his apparently trusty servant defrauding him. 
However, he thinks it better to be taken advan- 
tage of than to look upon his life-long com- 
panion as a hypocrite and a thief. But behold 
one day the sight of the glittering gold proves 
too alluring for the clerk's sense of justice; he 
embezzles a considerable sum of money and runs 
away. The merchant did not, strictly speaking, 
err. For he knew well that what did happen 
might happen. He took his chances ; he was the 
victim of his own strong sense of honor. The 
error in this instance was merely a " material " 
error. Let us add another example. You think 
perhaps that your eyesight is perfectly normal, 
that you see colors just as the majority of men do. 
But your assent to this conviction should be 
tempered by the proviso " as far as I know." 
For you may possibly discover upon careful in- 
vestigation that you are affected with a slight de- 
gree of color-blindness, a contingency you made 
allowance for in giving your conditional assent. 



Error, in What Respect Necessary 125 

Another point we wish to call attention to is 
this. When we state in our thesis that error is 
not physically unavoidable, this is to be under- 
stood, of course, to apply only to persons who 
have the proper use of their intellectual faculties. 
Hence we exclude from the scope of our thesis 
all those whose minds are in an abnormal condi- 
tion, as the insane, idiots, those dreaming, and 
others similarly circumstanced. These, it is 
plain, cannot avoid falling into error for the 
reason that they have not the full and unimpeded 
use of their mental and volitional powers. The 
fixed ideas of the madman, the incoherent judg- 
ments of one who is dreaming are all beyond 
their control to regulate. But what holds true 
of them, does not hold true of the well-balanced, 
normal mind. 

no. Summing up. To sum up — we began 
our treatise by analyzing and defining logical 
truth and some kindred notions; then, after 
showing ideas to be (logically) true, we asked 
ourselves the question, Do they possess truth in 
its fulness? To answer this query, we sought 
for a criterion which would guide us in deciding 
when truth has reached its fullest development. 
We ascertained that a sure mark of the com- 
plete possession of truth is the quiet or repose 
of the intellect. Next we cast about to see un- 
der what circumstances the mind is altogether 
at rest. We came to the conclusion that this is the 



126 Truth and Error 

case when it knows the thing in itself to be such as 
it is represented and when it moreover knows that 
it knows aright. We were then ready to reply- 
to the question proposed to ourselves in the be- 
ginning. In what mental operation does truth 
reach its highest perfection? We answered, in 
the judgment alone; for it alone satisfies the two 
conditions for the full possession of truth. A 
consideration of the question whether truth ad- 
mits of degrees ended our search into the truth 
of knowledge. We then passed on to the inves- 
tigation of the opposite of truth, namely error. 
After explaining the meaning of error we showed 
that judgments, but not ideas, can be false. 
Inquiring next whence error arises, we learned 
that in last resort it is always traceable to the 
will's undue influence upon the mind; from this 
we inferred that error, though never physically 
necessary, can be so morally. 

in. Conclusion. We have thus completed 
the treatise on the two opposites, truth and error. 
The one, error, shows us man in his littleness 
and weakness; it sets forth his limitations and 
his liability to fall short of perfection. — The 
other, truth, exhibits him in his greatness and 
glory ; it not only lifts him above brute creation, 
it leads him to the very source of all being. For 
by truth man knows finite things as they are 
and through them and in them, as in so many 
mirrors, God and his perfections. 



ALPHABETICAL INDEX 



(the numbers refer to the pages.) 



Analytical judgments, 24; 
inclusion of predicate 
in subject in these 
judgments, 53. 

Apprehension defined, 
13; simple apprehen- 
sion logically true, 27; 
simple apprehension 
falls short of the per- 
fection of truth, 58. 

Certitude, difference be- 
tween logical truth and 
certitude, 67; difference 
between the repose in 
truth and the repose in 
certitude, 68. 

Concept defined, 15; ob- 
jective concept, 15. 

Copula of a proposition 
defined, 25. 

Degrees in truth, 70; 
truth in itself inca- 
pable of degrees, 71; 
how the truth of ideas 
and of judgments ad- 
mits of degrees, 72; 
degrees in the (sub- 



jective) source of 
truth, 76; degrees in 
error, 102. 

Error defined, 86; error 
the contrary of truth, 
88; ideas not subject 
to error, 90; judg- 
ments subject to er- 
ror, 92; degrees in 
error, 102; error due 
to will, IQ4; how the 
will induces the intel- 
lect into error, 109; 
error though never 
physically necessary 
may be so morally, 
118; physical and 
moral necessity of er- 
ror, 118; formal and 
material error, 119. 

Falsity, truth and fal- 
sity contrasted, 9; 
falsity denned, 85; di- 
visions of falsity, 86; 
difference in meaning 
of terms falsehood, 
falseness, and falsity, 



127 



128 



Alphabetical Index 



86; logical falsity 
either negative or posi- 
tive disagreement of 
thought with thing, 

Form, meaning of term 
"form" in philosophy, 
27. 

Formal object of an 
idea, 17. 

Idea defined, 14; differ- 
ence between idea and 
phantasm, 19; differ- 
ence between judg- 
ment and compound 
idea, 62; ideas not 
subject to error, 90; 
ideas representations 
of things, and not mere 
subjective modifica- 
tions of the mind, 91; 
in what sense ideas 
may be called false, 

95. 

In actu signato and in 
actu exercito, meaning 
of these phrases, 38. 

Judgment defined, 20; 
perception of the 
agreement and dis- 
agreement between 
two ideas, the essence 
of the judgment, 21; 
immediate and medi- 
ate judgments, 24; an- 
alytical and synthetical 



judgments, 24; differ- 
ence between judg- 
ment and compound 
idea, 62; sense in 
which a true judgment 
can become false, 75. 

Knowledge, meaning of, 
54; evolution of knowl- 
edge, 83; infinite 
knowledge incapable 
of evolution, 84. 

Light, meaning of intel- 
lectual light, 78. 

Material object of an 
idea, 17. 

Notion defined, 15. 

Object of an idea in gen- 
eral, 18; material and 
formal object of an 
idea, 17. 

Objective concept, 15; in 
what sense things are 
said to be objectively 
real, 51. 

Phantasm, difference be- 
tween idea and phan- 
tasm, 19. 

Predicate defined, 25; 
predicate stands for 
what we know of sub- 
ject, 51; inclusion of 
predicate in subject, 

53. 
Proposition defined, 25; 
affirmative and nega- 
tive proposition, 25. 



Alphabetical Index 



129 



Sign defined, 63*; natu- 
ral and conventional 
signs, 63. 

Subject defined, 25; sub- 
ject stands for thing 
as it is in itself, 51; 
inclusion of predicate 
in subject, 53. 

Subjective concept, 15. 

Synthetical judgments, 
24; inclusion of predi- 
cate in subject in these 
judgments, 53. 

Truth in general de- 
fined, 2; ontological 
truth, 5; logical truth, 
6; moral truth, 8; 
propositional truth, 8; 
truth used metaphor- 
ically, 8; truth and 
falsity contrasted, 9; 
truth an analogical 
concept, 10; logical 
truth, truth properly 
so called, 10; logical 
truth conformity of 
subjective, not objec- 
tive concept with ob- 



ject, 17; mental repose 
an indication of pres- 
ence of perfect truth, 
36; requisites for this 
mental repose, 38; 
these requisites ful- 
filled in the judgment 
alone, 47, 54; perfec- 
tion of truth in the 
judgment alone, 59; 
difference between 
truth and certitude, 
67; difference between 
the repose in truth 
and that in certitude, 
68; degrees of truth, 
70; truth in itself in- 
capable of degrees, 71; 
how the truth of ideas 
and that of judgments 
admit of degrees, 72; 
sense in which a true 
judgment can become 
false, 75; degrees in 
the (subjective) source 
of truth, 76; error the 
contrary of logical 
truth, 88. 



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